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Abstract 
This master thesis addresses the forecast accuracy of individual inflation forecasts from the 
Survey of Professional Forecasters. Based on a variety of accuracy statistics, there are five main 
findings to report of. First, I find that some individuals are able to accurately predict inflation 
over time, and that forecasters on average have improved their accuracy over time. Second, 
forecasting accuracy becomes worse during recessions compared to the average accuracy in the 
respective decades but accuracy have improved in newer recessions compared to old ones. 
Nonetheless, some individuals are able to outperform the mean and a random walk model. 
Third, I find no difference in accuracy among industries, but I find evidence for biased forecasts 
for the three and four quarter horizon. Fourth, I find evidence for bias in roughly one-third of the 
individuals for all forecasting horizons. These results improve slightly when only data from the 
last two decades are being analysed. Fifth, the majority of individuals perform significantly 
worse than a random walk model regardless of used time span. 
I also find several problems with the database. These includes: missing values for the one-year-
ahead forecast, irregularities in forecasters’ response, reallocation of used ID’s, changing base 
year and inconsistencies in individuals’ forecasts. 
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Introduction 
Over the years a large amount of studies on inflation expectations from surveys have 
accumulated. One of the oldest surveys available in the U.S. is the Survey of Professional 
Forecasters (SPF) which started in 1968 and is now conducted by the Federal Reserve Bank of 
Philadelphia.
1
 Surveys have undergone extensive testing by economists and have undoubtedly 
participated greatly in the economic research the past 40 years. They have been used to test 
rational expectations theory, to analyze the formation of inflation expectations, in empirical 
research in macroeconomics, to investigate the formation and impact of monetary policy, and in 
a variety of other studies (Croushore 2009). 
The importance of inflation expectations has been heftily debated even though it plays a crucial 
role in many economic agents’ decisions (Elliott and Timmermann 2008; Mankiw et al. 2003). 
In an interview study of public attitudes towards inflation, Shiller (1997, cited in Shiller (2000)) 
showed that the general public pays a lot of attention to inflation, and it is widely believed that 
the inflation rate is a barometer of the economic and social health of a nation. He found that 
people had great feelings toward inflation, and perceived high inflation “as a sign of economic 
disarray, of a loss of basic values, and a disgrace to the nation, an embarrassment before 
foreigners” (Shiller 2000, p. 37). Consequently, it is reasonable to believe that people pay 
attention to the variable and is able to give realistic forecasts. Is it really so? Are individual 
forecasters able to accurately predict future inflation rates? 
In this paper I will attempt to make an assessment of the forecast accuracy for the forecasts in 
the SPF database. In order to separate my thesis from the vast literature which already exists on 
the subject, I have made some choices. First, due to the large emphasis on longer forecasting 
horizons in previous studies, especially the one-year-ahead horizon, I have chosen to keep the 
main focus on shorter horizons. Second, I will mainly focus on individual inflation forecasts and 
not the consensus view which is more common. Third, I will use the GDP price index as my 
measure of inflation in contrast to the consumer price index which is more frequently used. 
                                                 
1 Prior to 1992, when the Federal Bank of Philadelphia took over the survey, it was called the ASA-NBER Economic Outlook 
Survey. For simplicity I will only call it the SPF henceforth. 
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In this paper I find that some forecasters are able to predict inflation accurately over time, and it 
also seems as they are getting better at it over time. This conclusion does not hold for all 
forecasters, however. Next, forecast accuracy gets worse during recessions compared to the 
average accuracy during the respective decades. Some individuals, on the other hand, perform 
well in recessions and outperform a same change random walk model. Further, I find no 
difference in accuracy between industries but it seems as all three industries are biased for the 
three and four quarter horizons (at a five percent significance level). This is to my knowledge 
not documented before and thus represents an important finding. I also find evidence for some 
biased individuals, but the majority of forecasters are unbiased for all horizons (about 2/3 of the 
individuals). Last, most individuals, especially for the three longest horizons, do not add 
additional information to the forecast given by the same change random walk model. In other 
words, most of the forecasters fail to outperform the benchmark model. No newer papers have 
compared the random walk model and survey forecasts against the GDP price index. This result 
is still somewhat striking. Other studies find that survey forecasts outperform times series 
models when forecasting CPI inflation (Ang et al. 2007). Some do find, however, that the 
random walk model performs very well for some measures of inflation which could explain its 
good performance in this paper (Atkeson and Ohanian 2001). 
The outline of this paper is as follows. First I will present a theoretical framework with terms 
used in the paper and arguments for and against survey data. The second part will consist of the 
methodology used to assess the forecast accuracy, followed by part three which presents some 
characteristics with the data. The fourth part concerns the SPF database, and includes an 
introduction and a section on potential problems and caveats with the dataset. Next, in the fifth 
part, I present the results of my analysis concerning forecast accuracy. Sixth and last, I will give 
my concluding remarks and give some direction for future research. 
Literature review 
There are two characteristics which are widespread in most of the literature on inflation 
expectations from surveys. First, studies have shown that pooling or combining data into a mean 
(often called “consensus” (Gregory et al. 2001)) creates a more consistent and accurate forecast 
(Batchelor and Dua 1995). Thus, most studies use the consensus forecast when studying 
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expectations. Second, due to the large revisions of the national income and product account 
(NIPA) variables (such as GDP) there can be problems if these are used as a measure of 
inflation (Croushore 2006). Consequently, most researchers studying the SPF have used a 
variety of the CPI as their inflation measure, after it was introduced in 1981q3
2
. 
One of the first studies on the SPF database was conducted by Su and Su (1975), who assessed 
the accuracy of forecasts using only a few years of data. They found that forecasts from the 
database were significantly better than autoregressive extrapolations. They also stated that the 
SPF forecasts are better at forecasting changes in the levels of the data than the levels 
themselves. Some years later, Hafer and Hein (1985) compared the accuracy of three different 
inflation forecasting procedures; an univariate time series model, an interest rate model and 
forecasts from the SPF. Their general conclusion was that the median survey forecasts of the 
implicit GNP deflator provided the most accurate ex ante inflation forecasts, even though they 
used data from the most volatile period in the whole survey time span.
3
 Nevertheless, their 
results were in line with those of Su and Su, namely that SPF forecasts outperformed simple 
time series models. Another economist who has tested the SPF database extensively is Victor 
Zarnowitz. One of his first studies on the SPF forecast accuracy also included tests on an 
individual level for the first time. He argued that only using means or medians raised the 
possibility of aggregation errors such as differences among individuals and sampling variation 
(Zarnowitz 1984). Even though he acknowledged the importance of examining individual data, 
he still concluded that the consensus forecasts on average over time are more accurate than most 
individual forecasts and that this conclusion was valid for all variables and horizons. He also 
said that those individuals who did outperform the consensus had no common characteristics. 
Later, an even broader and more comprehensive study of the SPF database were conducted by 
Zarnowitz and Braun (1993). Here they provided a wealth of analysis on the database, with 
several important findings. First, they documented that forecast errors typically increase as the 
horizon increase, which is logical since there is more uncertainty associated with predicting 
development in macroeconomic variables further into the future. Second, they also stated that 
forecasters differed in many respects and therefore also their forecasts would differ. 
                                                 
2 Here q denotes quarter, and this notation should thus be read as first quarter in 2010. It will be used throughout the paper. 
3 During the 1970s and early 1980s the U.S. experienced a high inflationary period, with severely high growth. See section 3.3.1. 
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Nevertheless, they found some common trends among the individuals and argued that this was 
due to common information sets and interaction and influence with fellow forecasters. Third, 
they found great differences in the extent to which macroeconomic variables can be forecasted. 
Variables with high autocorrelation (such as real GDP) are easier to predict than those which are 
highly random (e.g. business inventories). Fourth, they found no evidence for an improvement 
in forecasting over time, despite an improvement in computer technology and access to more 
modern economic theories. Fifth, they underlined the findings from earlier studies that group 
consensus outperform the majority of individuals and thus represents an accessible and 
inexpensive method for improving forecasts from individuals. Last, they demonstrated that 
consensus survey forecasts perform favorably in comparison to most simple time-series models.  
There have also been conducted numerous studies testing the survey for bias, i.e. if the forecast 
errors are zero on average. Such tests are also imperative to prove rationality among individuals, 
i.e. if forecasters make repeated errors over time or not. The first tests on the Livingstone survey 
were not positive, as they suggested forecasters were biased and as a consequence not rational 
(Pearce 1979; Akhtar et al. 1983).  However, in a study on the SPF database the conclusion was 
opposite: Zarnowitz (1985) concluded that 85 percent of individuals were unbiased. On those 
which were biased, half were forecasts of inflation. These results of biasedness and irrationality 
provided forecasters with a bad reputation, and many economists started to believe that 
forecasters in fact were irrational or that surveys were not representative for market agents` real 
inflation expectations (Croushore 1996, 2006). That being said, there were other reasons for the 
bad performance during these years. First, there were unexpected OPEC oil shocks in the early 
1970s which drove up the rate of inflation. This was very hard to predict, which is why most 
forecasters performed badly and seemed biased during these times (Croushore 1993). Second, 
researchers were not aware of a problem economists today call the overlapping observations 
problem. When a shock hits the inflation variable, it affects not only one survey but several 
consecutive surveys. The reason for this is that the length of the forecast horizon normally is 
longer than the interval between the surveys, thus making the forecast errors correlated. By not 
taking this into consideration in their tests, researchers overstated the case against the surveys 
(Croushore 2009). In a later study on rationality, Keane and Runkle (1990) tested individuals 
from the SPF database and stated that much of the preceding literature on rationality were 
flawed for four reasons. First, the use of consensus forecasts was wrong because individuals 
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may have differing information sets. Second, they did not put enough effort in correct for 
revisions in the underlying data. Third, data from the Michigan survey were not trustworthy due 
to lack of incentive for the respondents to be rational in their responses, and fourth, past 
researchers failed to account for correlation in forecast errors across forecasters. When they 
dealt with all these previous mistakes they found that forecasters were unbiased and efficient, in 
contrast to most previous studies. 
Newer research papers have chosen other interesting topics for their studies. Mehra (2002) 
argues, among others, that the predictive ability of a forecaster has more to it than just 
outperforming a simple naïve benchmark (which, according to Mehra, is what earlier studies 
have assumed). He uses the test of Granger-causality to determine if the survey contains 
additional information about the subsequently realized inflation values than the past values. His 
findings suggest that survey forecasts do in fact Granger-cause inflation, meaning they can help 
predict actual future inflation. He also concluded that forecasters from the SPF were biased. 
Another interesting study was conducted by Mankiw et al. (2003). They discovered substantial 
disagreement among forecasters, i.e. that forecasts given for the same variable and horizon can 
vary substantially among individuals. They believe that this oversight can be explained by the 
fact that standard theory does not open for disagreement. By using a sticky-information model, 
in which forecasters only periodically update their expectations due to high costs of collecting 
and processing information, they can explain much of the disagreement present in the data.  
A fairly new study by Ang et al. (2007) compare and contrast four methods of predicting 
inflation: time-series models; regressions based on the Phillips curve using measures of 
economic activity; term-structure models derived from asset prices; and surveys. They conclude 
decisively that the survey-based measures yield the best results for forecasting CPI inflation, 
which seems to be in line with previous comparisons between surveys and time series models. 
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1. Theoretical framework 
Before turning to the analysis of the data, it is important to have some insight on the formation 
of expectations and why it is so important. This section will provide a brief explanation of these 
questions, and will also present some arguments for why I have chosen individual data from the 
SPF as my data. 
1.1 Expectations 
1.1.1 Why are expectations important? 
Expectations are very important for most people, even though many may be unaware of it. 
Almost everyone use expectations as a foundation for making everyday decisions, e.g. 
consumers, businesses, investors and authorities (Elliott and Timmermann 2008). Consumers 
alter their spending and saving based on the economic outlook, more specifically on factors such 
as future employment level and wage growth. Businesses use their expectations of future 
income and profitability to make investment decisions and to decide what strategy they are 
going to pursue. Investors use their expectations as a basis for decisions on what kind of assets 
to invest in, when to invest and much more. Most importantly, perhaps, is the importance of 
expectations for authorities` decisions. For example, it is crucial for central banks to take into 
consideration what expectations the consumers have when making policies, and it has a great 
deal of influence on wage negotiation (Thomas 1999). All of these decisions, which are based 
on expectations, will in turn affect the growth and inflation level in the economy. 
Inflation expectations have been an especially popular topic among researchers. The reason for 
this is probably because of the central banks` introduction of inflation targeting. It then became 
vital to check what people actually think and reveal if they use the information they should in 
order to make correct forecasts. Kershoff and Smit (2002) stated that almost every central bank 
with an inflation target studies inflation expectations surveys when forming monetary policies. 
This even goes for countries without a formal inflation target, like the U.S. If people do not 
make accurate inflation forecasts it means that they do not manage to make use of all the 
relevant information in order to predict the future. Thus, it becomes equally difficult for the 
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authorities to alter the peoples` expectations in order to affect the economy. A relevant example 
can be drawn from the recent economic crisis. As the economic growth plundered, and the 
employment level surged, people were starting to expect harder times and therefore started to 
cut their spending and increase their saving. The housing market bubble also left a lot of people 
without savings, thus reducing their spending even more. All of this affected the economy 
negatively and reduced growth further. This negative spiral would have continued if the 
authorities did not implement policies which altered people`s expectations and incentives to 
increase their spending. Low interest rates is one example of a policy which was meant to 
convince people that measures were being made to save the economy, and thus reducing the 
negative expectations people had. 
1.1.2 The formation of expectations 
Discovering how economic agents form their expectations is critical to our understanding of 
many economic outcomes. In the earlier years, when the term expectation was introduced, the 
common belief was that expectations were formed solely by looking at historical values of the 
variable; a so-called adaptive formation. Today, this thought is rejected by most researchers and 
is viewed to be too simplistic. A new theory arrived and argued that agents are rational, which 
simply means that forecasters employ all available information when forming future 
expectations (Akhtar et al. 1983). The underlying principle behind this change of thought was 
that agents are intelligent, and thus are able to correct for mistakes made in the past when 
predicting the future. This leads to the first of two characteristics of a rational forecaster: they do 
not systematically make errors. An important test in this regard is a test for bias, i.e. a test to 
check if the average forecasting error is equal to zero. The second characteristic concerns the 
issue of efficiency. In order for a forecaster to be efficient, he/she have to make use of all 
relevant information when forming their expectations. In this paper I will only focus on the first 
of these two characteristics, namely the forecasting accuracy. 
 Even though rational expectations have been widely accepted as the best way of describing the 
formation of expectations, there have been some critics which proclaim that the rational 
expectation formation theory was too easily accepted. Chow (2011), for instance, argues that 
there was insufficient empirical evidence for accepting the rational expectations hypothesis and 
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gives strong econometric evidence supporting the adaptive expectations hypothesis. It is 
probably more reasonable to believe that the formation follows a path which lies between the 
two extremes of adaptive and rational formation (Roberts 1998).  
1.2 The Survey 
In this paper all analysis will be based on survey data from the SPF.4 In this section I will 
present some general arguments for and against using this kind of data material based on earlier 
literature. 
1.2.1 Why use survey data? 
Surveys are a method for collecting data from a chosen sample of the public. The sample can 
then be used to make statistical inferences about the population. In this case a survey is used to 
ask a certain group of people about their predictions for the GDP price index variable, among 
others. The mean of the responses can be interpreted as a consensus for the expected inflation 
rate. 
According to Galati et al. (2011) surveys are one of two major methods to get hold of inflation 
expectations if one wants to work with such data. The first method consists of extracting 
inflation expectations using financial market instruments linked to some measure of inflation, 
e.g. bonds. If combined with a nominal counterpart one can back out financial markets` inflation 
expectations. It comes with a drawback, however, because it can be a bit technical to do the 
calculations in order to extract the expectations. What is more, one also has to take into 
consideration inflation-risk premium and liquidity premium (among others) which also increases 
the difficulty of this method. The second method is to use survey data, i.e. ask participants in the 
market what they believe (or expect) future inflation will be. This approach entails less 
knowledge about technical procedures, is easy to interpret and there are several surveys being 
conducted for several countries which are ready for use. However, as Galati et al. (2011) points 
out, it comes with some shortcomings. First, most surveys have a low frequency on their data 
                                                 
4 See section 4 for more on the SPF database. 
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making them less suited for analysis concerning existence and timing of breaks in formations 
over short horizons. Second, they question the reliability of respondents as there is no way to 
make sure that they actually live up to their predictions. Hopefully, this problem will be less 
prominent when using professional forecasters (more on this in next section). Third, it is also 
pointed out that different surveys provide totally different results on inflation expectations. In a 
study undertaken by Mankiw et al. (2003), where they looked at over fifty years of data on 
inflation expectations in the U.S., they found substantial disagreement among both consumers 
and professional economists about expected future inflation. Nevertheless, due to its simplicity 
and easy access, survey data seems like the most reasonable choice. 
1.2.2 Why use professional forecasters? 
Surveys can be conducted on many different types of groups. In the U.S., for example, they have 
surveys asking household consumers (the Michigan Survey), businesses (the Livingstone 
Survey) and professionals (the SPF). 
As stated by Gerberding (2006), participants in household surveys are more likely to have an 
opinion on the expected direction of future inflation than they are to give a precise predicted 
change for different horizons. In other words, she presents an argument in favour of qualitative 
data. In order to do an empirical analysis on such data, however, one needs to do a 
transformation to quantitative data which will inevitably bring along some uncertainty in the 
data. This is not likely to be a problem when using surveys with professional forecasters. They 
produce forecasts in their daily jobs, and should therefore be qualified to do a quantitative 
response to the survey. What is more, they also have a strong incentive to do a proper analysis 
before they turn in their answers as wrong answers may create some stigma in their professional 
life. This cannot be said of household or business (to some extent) surveys as they do not have 
to defend their answers in the same way. The same argument is underlined by Keane and Runkle 
(1990) who argue that professional forecasters predict the same expectations which they sell in 
the market and thus have an incentive to be accurate. What is more, others, e.g. Mestre (2007) 
and Ang et al. (2007), also conclude that professional forecasters outperform other agents on 
inflation expectations. Choosing professional forecasters as a source of data thus seems as a 
reasonable choice. 
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1.2.3 Why use individual data? 
Most of the literature on inflation expectations in surveys makes use of the mean or median 
forecasts in their studies. No wonder, since almost all articles on the matter conclude that 
consensus forecasts are superior to individual forecasts. A study by Bates and Granger (1969) 
was one of the first studies which concluded that a combined set of forecasters can result in a 
higher accuracy than either of the original forecasts. Further, in a review of the literature on 
combining forecasts where over 200 articles were studied, Clemen (1989) found that forecast 
accuracy can be substantially improved through the combination of multiple individual 
forecasts. Newer research has reached similar conclusions. Batchelor and Dua (1995), for 
example, stated in their paper that individual responses may contain behavioural biases which 
could be removed if pooled together (in Batchelor (2000)). 
There are those who argue for using individual data. Zarnowitz (1984) studied the accuracy of 
individual and group forecasts, acknowledging the importance to study both sides. Nonetheless, 
he concluded that “the group mean forecasts [...] are on average over time more accurate than 
most of the corresponding sets of individual predictions. This is a strong conclusion [...]” 
(Zarnowitz 1984, p. 15). Keane and Runkle (1990), in their study on rationality of individuals, 
gave a sharp critique of earlier studies on the subject. One of their arguments is that averaging 
individual forecasts will mask individual deviations from the consensus. If one group of people 
consistently make positive errors while another consistently make negative errors, the mean will 
become unbiased. They argue that the information given by the deviating groups are too 
important to loose in averaging all forecasts.  
Lately, there have been very few papers analyzing individual data. This makes it intriguing to 
investigate what affects individual forecasting accuracy under different scenarios or during 
different time periods. This paper will therefore focus on the forecast accuracy of individual 
forecasts. 
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2. Methodology 
This section will provide an outline of the methods used to assess the performance of the SPF 
database. This includes different measures for analyzing the forecast accuracy, and some 
statistical tests for comparing the performance between two different sources of forecasts. 
2.1 Forecast accuracy 
When talking about “the best” forecasting method one often interprets this as the forecasting 
method which is most accurate, i.e. result in the smallest error. There are several methods for 
evaluating a forecasts` accuracy, but most of them are calculated by comparing the values of the 
forecast against the actual (real) values of the same series.
5
 The forecast error is therefore 
defined as 
 =  −  
where At is the actual (real) value of the variable in question at time t, and Ft is the forecasted 
value at time t. 
I will use four different forecasting horizons in my analysis. They will range from a one quarter 
horizon to a four quarter horizon. The actual forecasts are calculated as follows: 
	
	1 = 100 ∗ 	3 2⁄ − 1 
	
	2 = 100 ∗ 	4 2⁄ − 1 
	
	3 = 100 ∗ 	5 2⁄ − 1 
	
	4 = 100 ∗ 	6 2⁄ − 1 
Where pgdp1-pgdp6 are the actual level forecasts given by the respondents in time t-1 to t+4 
(i.e. pgdp1 is the inflation level for last quarter, pgdp2 is the inflation level for the current 
quarter, pgdp3 forecast for next quarter etc.). 
                                                 
5 See for example Batchelor (2000), Mehra (2002) and Zarnowitz and Braun (1993) 
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In this section I will discuss different ways of measuring forecast accuracy. More specifically, I 
am going to make use of three different measures: 1) mean absolute error, 2) mean prediction 
error and last, 3) root mean squared error. When comparing the individual forecasts with those 
from the time series models, I will use Theil’s U-statistic and a forecast comparison regression. 
2.1.1 Mean absolute error 
The first measure discussed is mean absolute error (MAE):  
 = 	||"
#
$%
 
where N is the total number of observations and t denotes time. This measure is preferred if one 
think the error is linear, rather than quadratic, because it ignores the sign of the error. This 
implies that a forecast error which is one too low represents just as much as a forecast error 
which is one too high. The closer MAE is to zero, the more accurate the forecast is. 
2.1.2 Mean prediction error 
The second measure of forecast accuracy used in this paper is the mean prediction error (MPE): 
& = ' "( )
#
$%
 
This measure is a simple average of the forecasting errors and hence should be close to zero 
over a time period in order for a forecast to be unbiased. A positive value indicates that the 
forecaster have underestimated actual values, while a negative MPE indicates that forecasters 
have overestimated actual values.   
2.1.3 Root mean squared error 
The third, and last, measure discussed in this section is the root mean squared error (RMSE): 
*+ = ,1"	 -
#
$%  
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This measure is computed by squaring all errors, thus removing the sign of the error. The 
average of all errors are calculated (producing mean squared errors, or MSE), and as the name 
suggests, RMSE is the square root of MSE. The main difference between MAE and RMSE is 
the assumption of the characteristic of the error. In contrast to the MAE, RMSE assumes a 
quadratic error. This implies that an error of two percent is treated four times (2
2
) as serious as 
an error of one percent (in contrast to MAE where a two percent error is treated as twice as 
serious as a one percent error, because of assumed linearity in the error). Therefore, the RMSE 
put a larger penalty on forecasters who make a few large errors, relative to forecasters who make 
a larger number of small errors (Batchelor 2000). The forecast accuracy improves as the RMSE 
moves closer to zero. 
2.1.4 Theil’s U-statistic 
Theil's U-statistic is a simple measure on how well a model performes compared to a naive time 
series model. The idea behind the rule is that if a forecast is to be taken seriously, it should be 
more accurate than the forecast given by a simple benchmark. The measure compares the RMSE 
of the two models, as the definition shows: 
.ℎ01`	3 = *+			
*+		45
ℎ6	7	61 
In such a model, a value equal to one means that the two models have identical RMSE and thus 
are equally accurate. A value above (under) unity implies that the forecast (benchmark model) 
have a higher RMSE, and thus have performed worse (i.e. been less accurate). 
2.1.5 Benchmark model 
To assess the performance of the forecasts it is not enough to just look at accuracy statistics. 
Even if the forecast accuracy is terrible, it could still be characterized as a good forecast if no 
other forecasting methods are able to perform better. Thus, bad accuracy may still imply a 
decent performance relative to other methods. A common approach to account for this is to 
compare the survey`s forecast to a benchmark model. In this paper I will use a simple random 
walk model (RW) as a benchmark. According to this model the forecast for this quarter`s 
change in inflation for a given horizon will simply be the change experienced in last quarter for  
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the same horizon: 
*8:	,; = <=,; 
where Ft is the forecast for the current quarter at time t for horizon x, and At-1 is the actual value 
from last quarter for horizon x. Since the actual data is the percentage change in inflation the 
random walk model will represent a “same change model”, i.e. the forecast will be equal to the 
change in last quarter (in contrast to a “no change model”, where the forecast will represent no 
change in the level data). 
Previous studies have proven that this model performs reasonably well when forecasting 
inflation, as it even outperforms other more sophisticated time series models for some inflation 
measures (Ang et al. 2007; Atkeson and Ohanian 2001). It therefore seems as a legitimate 
choice to use this as a comparison to the survey forecasts. 
An expected advantage for this model is that it will be good at predicting turning points. While 
forecasters will have to analyse the economic situation based on numerous variables in order to 
precisely predict and time the actual turning point, the random walk model will automatically 
predict the turning point one quarter after it happened since it only bases it prediction on the first 
lagged value. On the other hand, the model will perform badly if the inflation rate has abrupt 
changes between high and low, as the model then will be unsynchronized with the actual values. 
2.2 Statistical tests 
2.2.1 Forecast comparison regression 
In order to statistically distinguish one forecasting model from another, one can perform a 
forecast comparison regression. The regression line in this situation will be: 
>,; = ? ∙ ,;ABC + 1 − ? ∙ ,;EF +	G,; 
where ,;ABCis the forecast of >,; from the SPF database, ,;EF  is the forecast from the naive 
benchmark model, and G,; denotes the forecast error associated with the combined forecast. 
Further, t denotes time and x represent the forecast horizon. If β=0, then forecasts from the SPF 
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database add nothing to the forecasts from the benchmark model, and we thus conclude that the 
naive model outperforms the SPF model. If β=1, then forecasts from the random walk model 
add nothing to the forecasts from the survey, and we then conclude that the SPF forecasts 
outperform the benchmark model. In order to indicate better performance by the SPF forecasts, I 
will test if the null of β equal to zero is rejected and thus conclude that β is significantly different 
from zero. This is in line with both Stock and Watson (1999) and Ang et al. (2007). 
To my knowledge it is not possible to restrict coefficients when performing a Newey-West 
regression in Stata. Thus, I had to rearrange the regression line in order to perform the analysis:  
'>,; − ,;EF) = ? ∙ ,;ABC − ,;EF +	G,; 
2.2.2 Bias 
A bias test confirms if the forecast errors are centered on the correct value or if they 
systematically diverge from the real values of inflation. In other words: it tests if the forecasters 
systematically over- or underestimate inflation. A common approach to conduct such a test is to 
do a simple regression on the following equation: 
	 = 	H + 	? + G 
where At are the actual values of the inflation variable, α is the constant term, Ft is the forecast 
in question and εt the corresponding standard error. Subsequently, the null hypothesis of no bias 
is tested, i.e. if α=0 and β=1 holds. If these conditions are not rejected, it suggests an unbiased 
forecast. It has been shown, however, that the conditions α= 0 and ß = 1  is not necessary for F 
to be an unbiased forecast of A. Holden and Peel (1990) show that by regressing forecast errors 
on a constant and test whether the constant can be restricted to zero, we get a condition that is 
both necessary and sufficient for unbiasedness. This method is also used by Mankiw et al. 
(2003), who re-arrange the original regression line above to the following: 
 −  	= 	H + G  
Thus, the necessary condition in order for a forecast to be unbiased is the null hypothesis of 
α=0. If the null hypothesis is rejected the individual will be characterized as biased. 
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3. Data 
This section will provide a brief introduction of the dataset from the SPF, followed by a section 
explaining the autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity in the data. Finally, a presentation of the 
actual data (i.e. the GDP variable) will be given. 
3.1 Descriptive statistics 
Due to the volatility in the GDP variable it is inevitable that some periods have been more 
turbulent than others when it comes to change rates in the inflation variable. This also leads to 
highly different standard deviations in the different time periods. The standard deviation has a 
useful purpose when assessing forecast accuracy, because it can be interpreted as a direct 
measure for the difficulty of forecasting in each period (McNees 1992). It will then be possible 
to compare forecasts given in different periods with different degrees of difficulty. The figures 
below illustrate the development of the standard deviation of inflation change over time for 
different forecast horizons. Figure 1 shows the standard deviation of the one-year-ahead 
forecasts from the SPF across time. From this figure, one can see that the inflation forecasts 
have become less erratic and volatile over time. Figure 2 shows the standard deviation for the 
real change in inflation for the four different horizons. It illustrates that the 1970s and 1980s 
were the most difficult periods to forecast in. After this there was a sharp decrease in the 
standard deviation, and inflation in the 1990s and 2000s ought to have been much easier to 
predict. For the two shortest horizons the 1980s have been most difficult to predict. 
The number of participants who have responded to the survey have varied over its life time, as 
can be seen from figure 3. It also highlights the dwindling participation up to the closure of the 
survey, before the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia took over responsibility for the 
execution. In the beginning the participation was very high, with a maximum of over 60 
participants. After 1990, the number has become lower and it seems as the participation 
stabilized around the total mean of about 35. 
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Figure 1 and figure 2: Average standard deviation for the four quarter forecast from the SPF 
(left) and standard deviation per decade for real inflation change for all forecast horizons (right) 
 
Figure 3: The number of participants in the survey across time 
  
When doing an analysis on individuals it is best to have long uninterrupted series of responses to 
examine if the forecasters are able make accurate forecasts over time. It is possible for everyone 
to have a lucky guess a quarter or two in a row, but a forecaster who gives accurate forecasts 
quarter after quarter for a long time has much more credibility and a higher justification to be 
called accurate. Panel A in table 1 shows the five longest consecutive forecasting series, who 
they belong to and when it happened, while panel B gives some information on how many series 
which fall into different bins of varying length. As we can see, the longest series of consecutive 
responses is 49 quarters given from 1990q1 until 2002q2. Next individual has given 40 
consecutive responses in the 2000`s, followed by two forecasters in the 1980`s and 1990`s with 
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36 consecutive responses. These will be well suited for analysis in the following sections. Panel 
B gives important information on how the situation is further down on this ranking. It shows, as 
we have seen in panel A, two series which are longer or equal to 40 quarters. Further, we have 
eight series which fall into the bin consisting of series between 30 and 39 responses, 24 series 
ranging from 20-29 responses and 127 series with length from 10-19 quarters. In other words, 
one can observe several individuals with an adequate amount of consecutive responses to test 
accuracy over time. 
Table 1: The five longest consecutive series of responses 
 
3.2 Autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity 
An inevitable characteristic of a survey like the SPF is the issue of overlapping observations 
(Croushore 2006; Grant and Thomas 1999).When testing forecasts over an equal or longer 
horizon than the sampling frequency of the data (e.g. one-year-ahead forecasts while the 
sampling frequency is quarterly) one need to take into consideration that a shock affects several 
of the underlying quarters. If an inflation shock affects actual data in 2010q1, this means that 
forecast errors from 2009q1 up until 2010q1 are all correlated.  
Autocorrelation in the errors is a violation on the assumptions behind regular ordinary least 
square (OLS) regressions, making results from this kind of analysis spurious (Granger and 
Newbold 1974). OLS assumes that the errors in the regression are uncorrelated, normally 
distributed and have a constant variance (homoscedasticity). The last assumption is also most 
likely violated in our data set, because some individuals are more accurate than others and 
Panel A: Panel B:
ID Maxrun From To
65 49 1990q1 2002q2 >39 2
510 40 2001q4 2011q4 30-39 8
70 36 1980q3 1989q3 20-29 24
30 36 1981q2 1990q2 10-19 127
433 34 1990q4 1999q2 1-9 1244
Number of responses
Note: Panel A shows the longest series of consecutive responses  
(maxrun) given by a forecaster. Panel B shows number of 
consecutive series that fall into different bins of varying length.
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because some periods are harder to predict than others. This implies heteroscedasticity in our 
data (in addition to autocorrelation).  
A solution to this problem, taken from Croushore (2006), is to adjust the covariance matrix as 
shown by Newey and West (1987) and thus guarantee a positive definite covariance matrix. This 
will overcome the problem of heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation in the errors in the dataset. 
Practically, this will imply running a Newey-West regression with heteroscedasticity and 
autocorrelation consistent (HAC) standard errors when doing the forecast comparison regression 
and bias test mentioned in section 2.2.2 (p.19). This method will prevent any problems with 
autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity in the error terms of our data.6 
3.3 Actual data 
This paper will assess the predictive accuracy of inflation forecasts from individual forecasters. 
Inflation is known as an increase in the general price level for goods and services within a 
country over a certain time span. There are a number of diverse variables, which differs both in 
calculation method and content, which strive to describe the same phenomenon. A suitable 
question would then be which variable should one use?  
In the SPF survey they have forecasts for two main inflation variables, namely the CPI index 
and the GDP price index
7
. Which variable to choose depends on the purpose of the study. 
Consumers would be best off using the CPI, as that measure gives the increase in price of a 
fixed basket of consumer goods. The GDP deflator, on the other hand, is more dynamic and can 
be used to show new expenditure patterns as it is based on all domestically produced goods in 
the country. I have chosen to use the GDP deflator as the inflation variable. 
When using the GDP deflator one should be aware of that the variable undergoes severe 
revisions from the first initial calculations. This makes it hard to know which revision one is 
supposed to use as actual data. Studies have pointed out results demonstrating significant 
differences in accuracy between using the initial or revised data on GDP (Croushore and Stark 
                                                 
6 Since our data have a quarterly frequency I will use a lag of four in the Newey-West regressions. 
7 Prior to 1996, GDP implicit deflator. Prior to 1992, GNP deflator (Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia 2011). 
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2001; Stark and Croushore 2002). They found that even though data revisions can have a large 
effect on its accuracy, it tend to not alter the relative accuracy between the survey and the 
benchmark projections (Stark 2010). McNees (1992) also concluded that forecasts are much 
more accurate when compared to preliminary data than they are compared to final revised data. 
He argues that if the aim is to measure how close forecasters come to what actually happened it 
is clear revised data is a better estimate of reality. This line of argumentation is perfectly logical; 
if forecasters cannot predict what actual revised inflation will be, but are only able to predict 
preliminary inflation, their forecasts are not much use for anyone. With this in mind, I will use 
the final revised data of the GDP deflator as actual values. 
This choice may have some negative effects, considered that the random walk model is based on 
the final revised version of the GDP price index. It could be argued that this gives an advantage 
compared to the forecasters who only have knowledge of an preliminary version of the inflation 
rate when they make their forecasts. Thus, my use of revised data may bias the results against 
the individual forecasters. 
3.3.1 Historical development 
In order to explain differences in forecast accuracy over time it is important to see how the 
inflation variable has developed over the time span of the survey. Over the past 40 years the real 
GDP deflator has had a striking linear growth, as it started at a level of 20 in 1968 and now has 
almost reached a level of 120 (see figure 4). By first sight, it seems as though it should cause no 
problems for forecasters to predict a simple linear trend. On the other hand, if we look at the 
four quarter ahead actual growth, it becomes more evident that forecasters need some skills in 
order to predict the actual change (which is what I am measuring in this paper). This highly 
inflationary period can mostly be explained by politics. In the late 1960s the U.S. was in a 
recession and it was an election year. To keep a low unemployment level President Nixon 
pressured the Federal Reserve to keep low interest rates, with the purpose of providing the 
public with a sense of recovery from the recession. This, however, turned out to be a short-lived 
satisfaction. In 1972-73 inflation started to rise sharply and it did not come under control until 
Paul Volcker became chairman of the Fed and introduced a tight monetary policy. This highly 
disturbing period has also led to the Federal Reserve keeping a more cautious and closer look at 
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the inflation. Later, the annual change in inflation has been stable in the low single digits, which 
leads to a more predictable variable. 
Figure 4 also depicts all U.S. recessions during the time span of the survey. According to the 
National Bureau of Economic Research (2010) there have occurred seven recessions, with four 
of them happening in the first 15 years of the survey. 
Figure 4: Development for the GDP price index and U.S. recessions 
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4. The Survey of Professional Forecasters 
This section will contain information regarding the SPF database.
8
 I will first do an introduction 
and a brief summary of the database, before I provide a section concerning the timing of the 
survey explaining available information at the time forecasts were given. Finally, I will present 
our work relating to problems and caveats with the database. 
4.1 Introduction 
The SPF is a quarterly survey started in the fourth quarter of 1968, thus making it the oldest 
quarterly survey of macroeconomic forecasts in the U.S. It was started as a joint venture by the 
American Statistical Association (ASA) and the National Bureau of Economic Research 
(NBER), which led to its original name: the ASA-NBER economic outlook survey. Among the 
variables to be forecasted initially was the change in the GNP deflator, and horizons for 1-4 
quarters ahead. They collected forecasts of the GNP deflator from 1968 to 1991, the GDP 
deflator from 1992 to 1995, and the GDP price index since 1996 (Federal Reserve Bank of 
Philadelphia 2011). This change in variable causes no severe problems, since the GNP deflator, 
GDP deflator and GDP price index behave quite similarly and there are no apparent breaks in 
the forecast series to be seen in either of the years where the change took place (Croushore 
2006). The objectives of the survey were first stated in Mincer and Zarnowitz (1969), and later 
the performance in the first 22 years of operation was assessed in Zarnowitz and Braun (1993). 
The survey was very popular in the early years with over 50 participants each quarter. However, 
as time passed the participation declined so much that it was decided to end the survey in first 
quarter of 1990. Later the same year it was decided that the survey should be resumed, now 
under control of the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. Measures were taken to ensure a 
higher level of participants and the timing of mailing and collecting the survey was improved in 
order to make them more consistent over time. 
                                                 
8 More info and data can be found online at http://www.phil.frb.org/research-and-data/real-time-center/survey-of-professional-
forecasters/ 
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The respondents are, as the name of the survey implies, professional forecasters. This means the 
receivers of the survey have forecasting as a part of their job. This includes professors, bankers, 
consultants and other who have continuous interaction with macroeconomic data in their daily 
job. Participants are held anonymous in order to encourage people to provide their best forecasts 
without worrying about potential forecast errors or forecasts which may contradict with their 
jobs position (Croushore 1993). The survey is mailed to participants the day after the 
government release of quarterly data on national income and product accounts (NIPA). It asks 
for point forecasts for many different variables and time horizons. 
4.2 Timing 
When comparing different series of forecasts it is imperative to take into consideration the 
timing of the survey to ensure that all parties have the same starting point and the same 
information set when predicting. After the Federal Reserve of Philadelphia took over the survey 
in 1990q2 they made sure to maintain a consistent timing of the conduction of the survey 
(Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia 2011).
9
 The survey is mailed to all participants just after 
the release of the NIPA advance report10, which happens in the first month of the quarter. 
Included in the survey is a report on recent historical values of different variables from different 
sources, in order to make sure participants produce their forecasts on the same basis. The survey 
is due in the second or third week of the middle month each quarter. This implies that the 
participants can take advantage of information in the variables in question up until this time. 
There are no official data released during these weeks, however, so the last information the 
participants have knowledge of is from the preceding quarter. The results of the survey are 
released in the middle month, well before the next survey is sent to the participants. An example 
may enlighten the matter further: just after the advanced report is released in 2010q1 (January) 
the survey for the same quarter is sent to its participants. They now have knowledge to all 
historic values of the GDP price index up until 2009q4. They provide forecasts for 2010q1, 
                                                 
9 Their first survey was officially in 1990q2. However, this survey was conducted after the fact because they had not yet 
received all the information from the NBER/ASA that they needed to conduct it in real time (Stark 2010). 
10 This contains preliminary results on the GDP deflator from the current quarter. 
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2010q2, 2010q3, 2010q4 and 2011q1. The one-year-ahead forecast comes as a result of their 
forecast of 2011q1 relative to 2010q1. As Croushore (2006) points out, even though this 
represents a four quarter period the end of the forecast horizon (2011q1) actually is five quarters 
after their latest known observation of the GDP price index (2009q4). The table below 
highlights the most important information regarding the timing of the survey.   
When it comes to the timing before the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia took over the 
survey in the second quarter of 1990 there is no certain documentation of the timing prior to this 
date (Croushore 2006). However, according to Stark (2010), a recent analysis of the timing 
when the ASA-NBER was in charge of the survey suggest that the schedule was very similar to 
the one we can observe now at the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
11
 
 
Table 2: Timing of the Survey of Professional Forecasters, from 1990q3 to present. 
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia (2011) 
 
                                                 
11 They compared the latest-available historical observation in the survey’s data set with the values as they appear in the 
Philadelphia Fed’s real-time data set and found a close correspondence, particularly since 1985. 
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4.3 Problems with the database 
This section will give a presentation of potential problems and caveats one should be aware of 
when working with the SPF database.
12
 It will also contain some proposed solutions which can 
be implemented to remove or minimize the problems at hand. This analysis is only conducted 
based on the one-year-ahead forecast horizon. 
4.3.1 Irregular forecasters 
An inevitable problem with individual data is the irregularity in respondents` participation. 
Since the survey is based on volunteer participation it is up to each individual to answer the 
survey or not. It is therefore unavoidable that most respondents at some time will give less 
priority to the survey if they are preoccupied with work or other business. This problem is also 
present in this dataset, where one often finds several gaps in an individual`s forecast series. This 
poses a challenge because it limits the number of long individual forecast series which can be 
used for analysis. The point with individual accuracy is to study if some individuals perform 
consistently accurate over time. Thus, it is not interesting to do analysis on a forecast series only 
a few quarters long. It will also make it harder to do statistical analysis as it may require longer 
data series to gain enough information. 
The above-mentioned problem is also pointed out in most previous articles dealing with 
individual data in the SPF database. In Zarnowitz (1985, 1984)  and Keane and Runkle (1990) 
they remove individuals which have less than 10, 12 and 20, respectively, responses from their 
dataset. This ensures that the problem becomes less prominent, and it removes the sporadic 
forecasters who give us no useful information. In order to see how these changes will affect the 
database, table 3 shows some descriptive statistics regarding the participation in the survey. 
Panel A shows the number of surveys per respondent, which is equal to the number of quarters 
the forecasters have responded to the survey. As we can see the average number of surveys 
increase as the irregular forecasters are removed, providing a dataset more eligible for analysis. 
The standard deviation of surveys per respondent decreases which is logical since individuals 
                                                 
12 This section is the result of our work as research assistans for the crisis, restructuring and growth project. It was performed in 
cooperation with Karen Oftedal Eikill, and she therefore deserves some of the credit. 
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with few responses are removed. The highest 
number of surveys an individual responded to 
was 123 (but this does not imply 123 consecutive 
responses). Panel B shows the number of 
respondents per survey. When eliminating 
irregular forecasters the total number of unique 
forecasters decreases, along with the average 
number of forecasters per survey. This basically 
means that data on fewer respondents are 
included than would have been if the whole 
dataset were used.  The changes to the data are 
not very large which suggests that removing 
irregular forecasters do not alter the database 
significantly. In my further analysis in this paper I will use data where those individuals with 
less than 12 responses are removed. 
The descriptive statistics of key variables in the survey also changes when respondents are 
dropped. Table 4 shows the alteration of these variables when individuals with less than 12 
responses are dropped. The mean of the forecasts for pgdp2 and pgdp6 both increase somewhat, 
from 138.54 to 138.93 for pgdp2 and from 144.21 to 144.59 for pgdp6. Thus, the one- year 
ahead forecasts also increases, from 3.68 percent to 3.71 percent. The standard deviations also 
increase slightly, while the minimum and maximum values are the exact same. All in all, the 
changes in the database due to dropped responses are minor and should have no impact on the 
coming analysis.  
Table 3: Selected distributional statistics 
over whole sample and two sub-samples 
 
Table 4: Statistics for key variables before and after dropping irregular forecasters 
 
Responses All >12 >20
Obs deleted - 652 1336
Total obs 6568 5916 5232
Panel A:  Number of surveys per individual
Total surveys 173 173 173
Mean 41.4 45.2 49.1
Std. Dev. 26.6 25.3 24.4
Min 1 12 20
Max 123 123 123
Panel B:  Number of individuals per survey
Total respondents 313 176 131
Mean 42.2 41.8 41.3
Std. Dev 13.4 13.3 13.2
Min 9 9 9
Max 83 83 83
Note: Table shows descriptive statistics for different 
subsamples. 
Sample
Statistic pgdp2 pgdp6 forecast 1yr pgdp2 pgdp6 forecast 1yr
Observations 6563 6134 6133 5912 5545 5544
Mean 138.54 144.21 3.68 138.93 144.59 3.71
Std 32.03 35.97 2.16 32.53 36.41 2.17
Min 104.41 105.7 -4.57 104.41 105.7 -4.57
Max 235 247 31.14 235 247 31.14
>12 responsesAll
Note: table shows descriptive statistics for key variables, before and after 
removing irregular forecasters (i.e. with less than 12 responses).
 31
Figure 5 shows a plot of the number of dropped individuals against the time variable. The figure 
illustrates that there are irregular forecasters over the whole time period, not only confined to a 
specific part of the survey. The maximum number of dropped individuals in one quarter is 16, 
which was in 1970q4. After year 2000 there have not been more than seven individuals with less 
than 12 responses per quarter, which could imply that forecasters have become more regular in 
recent times. Figure 6 shows how the median one-year-ahead forecast have changed after the 
removal of irregular forecasters. As one can see, the differences are small with the largest being 
0.3 percent in 1990q4.  
 
Figure 5 and figure 6: Number of dropped respondents per quarter (left) and the difference in 
the median inflation forecast before and after removal of irregular forecasters (right) 
4.3.2 Missing values 
There are some problems with missing values in SPF database. In this context, missing values is 
not connected to the problem mentioned above with individuals not responding to the survey, 
but rather when individuals decide not to respond to all questions in the survey. This problem 
becomes particularly prominent when looking at the average value of the one-year-ahead 
forecast horizon. According to our inspection, there are five quarters which have no values at 
all: 1969q1-q3, 1970q1 and 1974q3. It should be noted that this issue does not concern the 
smaller forecast horizons. The reason for these missing values has to be due to missing values 
for variables pgdp2 and/or pgdp6.
13
 However, examinations of the data material have shown that 
                                                 
13 See calculation of one-year-ahead forecast in section 2, p. 15. 
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it is missing values for the pgdp6 variable that is causing the problem. There are two plausible 
solutions on this problem. First, one can start using the data after the last quarter with missing 
values for the four quarter forecast, i.e. drop all observations before 1974q4. This would ensure 
observations in all quarters for this forecast horizon and thus not bias our results. Another 
advantage with this method is that it demands very little effort to drop the unwanted 
observations, in contrast to other methods which may require more calculations. It should be 
noted, however, that this method may result in valuable information being lost. By removing 
almost 20 quarters with observations, one may get different answers and conclusions than 
before, especially when we take into consideration the volatility of the inflation variable during 
those years. Second, one can fill in values for the pgdp6 variable based on the other values the 
individuals reported on the respective surveys. As mentioned above, some forecasters chose to 
leave out some information in the surveys and as it turns out it was often only the pgdp6 value 
which was left out. One possible solution is to do a linear projection based on the other variables 
(pgdp2-pgdp5). A possible equation could be: 
6 = 	5	 ∗ 	JK21L + K32L + K43L + K54LM /4 
This method generates a value for pgdp6 by projecting pgdp5 based on the average growth rate 
in the other variables. This method entails filling in 396 (340) new values of pgdp6 when 
keeping (removing) individuals with less than 12 responses. As we can see from table 5, neither 
method change the basic statistics of the one-year-ahead forecast or pgdp6 much. It also fills in 
values for pgdp6 in all the quarters which previously had no observations. It therefore seems as 
a reasonable method to use. 
 
Another method for inspecting if these changes alter the database too much is to compare the 
median value in the individual database with the median database found on the SPF website. 
Initially, these two should be, and are, perfectly equal. After filling in values and dropping 
respondents, however, there are some differences to be seen. Figure 7 shows the difference 
between the aforementioned series when values are filled in but before individuals with less than 
twelve responses are removed. It shows minor errors, with the biggest ones being just above 0.1 
percent and the errors being dispersed over the whole time span. Figure 8 shows the same as 
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figure 7, only now we have removed the irregular forecasters. The errors are now larger and 
more frequent, with the largest errors at about 0.3 percent. Even though we see a worsening 
picture, it cannot be said to be all that bad. It seems as though filling in values by linear 
interpolation does not alter the characteristics of the database in a too large extent. Since I am 
doing analysis on multiple horizons, I have chosen not to implement any of the above-
mentioned suggestions. 
 
Figure 7 and figure 8: Difference between the median one-year-ahead forecast from the 
individual database and the median database from the SPF website, before (left) and after 
(right) removing individuals with less than 12 responses 
Table 5: Basic statistics before (top) and after (bottom) removing individuals with less than 
12 responses 
 
 
Note: Variables ending with new (or ~w) represents new variables after filling in values with above-
mentioned procedure. 
Figure 7: 
 
Figure 8: 
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4.3.3 Reallocation of ID numbers 
Another problem with the database relates to the identification (ID) numbers, given to each 
respondent in order to secure anonymity of that person. Unfortunately, as the documentation 
paper from Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia (2011) suggests, there could be some 
problems with the allocation of these ID numbers. This entails some negative consequences and 
one should use some caution when interpreting the identifiers associated with each respondent. 
First, it has been discovered occurrences where the same ID number could represent different 
individuals over the time span of the dataset. In some occurrences a respondent drops out and 
then reenters several periods later, suggesting that a new individual may have been given an 
already used number. This is only a problem in the data from when the NBER-ASA was in 
charge of the survey, i.e. from 1968q4-1990q1. The lack of hard-copy historical records 
prevents anyone from looking into this problem, thus making it hard to come up with any 
solutions to the problem. It is guaranteed that this is not a problem after the Federal Reserve 
Bank of Philadelphia took over the survey in 1990q2. Second, a new problem arose when the 
Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia took over the survey and introduced the industry variable. 
The question was, if a respondent change jobs (i.e. the industry variable changes) should the ID 
number follow the respondent or the initial firm? Being aware of the issue, the Federal Reserve 
Bank of Philadelphia decided on a guideline for how to deal with it. If a forecast seems more 
associated with the firm than the individual, the ID number stays with the firm and the 
respondent gets a new ID (and vice versa). Unfortunately, they do not give any information on 
which ID`s this concerns. When analysing individuals this could be a problem if the 
identification number is more connected to a firm than to an individual, as tests on ID’s in 
reality will concern the associated firm and not necessarily one specific individual. 
Even though there is a vast literature concerning the SPF database, there is to our knowledge not 
anyone using individual data who discusses the above-mentioned problems.
14
 One reason for 
this is that they mostly use the old data from NBER-ASA and hence were not aware of the 
problem. Other researchers use the mean or median forecasts in their studies, thus ignoring the 
                                                 
14 See for example Zarnowitz (1984), Zarnowitz and Braun (1993) and Keane and Runkle (1990)  
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problems connected with individuals. There has been done little research on individual data in 
the recent years, which also implies a lack of an up-to-date solution to the abovementioned 
problem.  
One possible solution to this problem could be to divide individuals where large gaps in 
responses occur into two or more ID`s. The problem with this solution is that the Federal 
Reserve Bank of Philadelphia is not absolutely sure if ID`s really were re-used, they only know 
it could be a problem. A pause in responses from an individual does not necessarily mean it is a 
new person; it could be an individual who deliberately decided to stop responding to the survey 
for a time, and then started again at a later stage. Nevertheless, if the gap is big enough it could 
be argued that the respondent would have changed some over the years anyhow and calling 
her/him a new person would not be a terribly wrong act. When deciding how large the gap 
should be before the ID is divided up, we should also take into consideration that some 
respondents can be absent due to natural causes such as child birth and sick leave. Another 
thinkable scenario is where an individual changed jobs, and thus could not be called a 
“professional forecaster” anymore before he/she reentered the forecasting business at a later 
stage. The gap should therefore be large enough to consider such causes, e.g. 5 years (or 20 
quarters) or more.  
In table 6 we show some statistics concerning gaps in individuals’ forecasting series. On 
average, when all forecasters are included, the average gap in a forecaster’s series is 0.82 
quarters with a corresponding standard deviation of 4.21. The largest gap is 73 quarters, which 
constitutes roughly 18 years. Based on this, it seems highly probable that reallocation is present. 
The table also points out that there are more forecasters without a gap in their response than 
there are forecasters with gaps (see column 1: “obs”). If only those with gaps are included the 
average size of the gap is 3.61 quarters with a high corresponding standard deviation of 8.24. 
One of the solutions mentioned above in section 4.3.2 was to start with data from 1974q4 in 
order to deal with missing values. This solution would also do some good when it comes to gaps 
in the forecasting series. As the last row illustrates, the average size on the gap and the 
corresponding standard deviation goes down when we start at a later time. This suggests that 
most of the gaps are positioned in the early stages of the survey. Table 6 also gives the same 
statistics after we have removed irregular forecasters. This measure will improve the gap 
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statistics for all of the different scenarios included in the table, which put emphasis on the 
correctness of implementing this measure. 
Table 6: Gap statistics before and after removing irregular forecasters 
 
Going more in detail, it could be interesting to see how many individuals who in fact have large 
gaps in their forecasting series. Table 7  illustrates such numbers on gaps from five to twenty 
years, before and after we have corrected for irregular forecasters. It illustrates that fifty-eight 
individuals have a gap larger than five years, twenty-nine with gaps larger than ten year, four 
with a larger gap than fifteen years and none with gaps larger than twenty years. After removing 
irregular individuals, the numbers become better. There are forty individuals with a gap larger 
than five years, sixteen with a gap larger than ten years and none with larger gaps. Here we can 
also see that removing irregular forecasters improve some of the faults in the database.
15
 
We also want to examine if the gaps are more 
prominent in a certain time period, and hence 
expose if there is a pattern in their occurrences. 
By plotting the number of gaps larger than five 
and ten years, as seen in figure 9 and figure 10, 
we can see that most of the gaps are mainly 
located in the beginning of the survey. This 
coincides with the finding in table 6. In 
                                                 
15 We have to be aware of the fact that there could be individuals with more than one gap. After a closer look, however, we find 
that there are no individuals who have more than one gap larger than five years (and thus no one with even larger gaps). 
A: Before removing irregulars B: After removing irregulars
Obs Mean Std Max Obs Mean Std Max
All 6255 0.82 4.21 73 5740 0.66 3.37 51
With gap 1421 3.61 8.24 73 1229 3.08 6.76 51
No gap 4834 0.00 0.00 0 4511 0.00 0.00 0
From 1974q4 4844 0.48 1.95 46 4477 0.44 1.91 46
Note: Table shows statistics concerning gaps in the individuals` forecasting 
series, before and after removing irregular forecasters (i.e. less than 12 
responses).
Table 7: Number of individuals with large gaps
 
Observations All >12 >12
Gap\Time span >1968q4 >1968q4 >1974q3
>5 yr 58 40 21
>10 yr 29 16 2
>15 yr 4 0 0
>20 yr 0 0 0
Note: table shows the number of 
individuals with gaps larger than a given 
number, for different sub samples.
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1970q3 there are five individuals with a gap larger than five years, which is the highest number 
of individuals in one quarter. Later there are only a couple of individuals just before 1995 with 
large gaps. This tells us that the problem is mostly present during the NBER-ASA period of the 
survey as only three gaps come from the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia period. For gaps 
longer than ten years, all except two are in the beginning of the survey; just before 1975 and 
1995. A possible solution to the problem could then be to start with data from 1974q4. If we 
look at this subsample, there are only twenty-one observations with gaps longer than five years, 
and only two with gaps longer than ten years (see table 5). In other words, it reduces the 
problem to a great extent. 
Figure 9 and figure 10: Number of individuals with gaps larger than five (left) and ten years 
(right) in their forecasting series 
 
4.3.4 Changing base year 
When working with level data from the SPF database one should be aware of the fact that there 
are multiple changes in base year for several variables. Every fifth year, when there are 
benchmark revisions to the NIPA variables, the base year might change in addition to the data 
being revised. Since the forecasted levels in the data set have not been rescaled after the base 
year changes, the levels in the SPF dataset use the base year which was in effect when the 
questionnaire was sent to the forecasters. For the GDP deflator variable there have been eight 
changes in base year: 1976q1, 1986q1, 1992q1, 1996q1, 1999q4 and 2004q1 and 2005q1 
(Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia 2011) They are listed in table 8 below, and shown in 
figure 11. 
Figure 9:  
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When working with percentage changes, the base 
year revisions do not have to be a problem, because 
the effect on the inflation rate is likely to be minor 
(Diebold et al. 1997; Clements 2006a). But, if we 
want to compare the quarterly levels of pgdp with 
the real data, a problem might occur. The survey 
may ask forecasters for predictions where the 
predicted horizon cross the time for the next base 
year change. One way to solve this could be to 
exclude all forecasts with horizons which extend 
beyond the date of systematic data revisions from 
the data (Keane and Runkle 1990). One could also 
use vintage data when comparing (Clements 
2006b). Vintage data will always have the same 
base year as the forecasts, as vintage data are the data which were available at the time the 
forecast was made. It is also interesting to see if the forecasters managed to keep track of the 
base year changes in their forecasts. One way to inspect this is to plot the variable in question 
over time and see if there are any abnormalities. According to figure 11, which demonstrates the 
changing base year in the pgdp2 and pgdp6 variables, it seems reasonable to believe that the 
individuals were able to take into consideration the changes in base year when forecasting.  
Figure 11: Base year changes for the pgdp2 and pgdp6 variables 
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Table 8:Base year changes for NIPA 
variables, including the GDP deflator 
variable 
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of 
Philadelphia (2011) 
 
Range of Surveys Base Year 
1968:Q4 to 1975:Q4 1958
1976:Q1 to 1985:Q4 1972
1986:Q1 to 1991:Q4 1982
1992:Q1 to 1995:Q42 1987
1996:Q1 to 1999:Q33 1992
1999:Q4 to 2003:Q4 1996
2004:Q1 to 2009:Q2 2000
2009:Q3 to present 2005
Note: In the survey of 1992q1, the surveys 
measure of output swithces from GNP to GDP. In 
the survey of 1996q1, the surveys measure of 
NIPA prices and quantities switches to chain-
weighted measures.
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4.3.5 Outliers and consistency of forecasts 
A potential problem with most databases is biased results due to corrupt data. Thus, it is 
important that data used in the analysis are reliable and consistent. It is possible that errors from 
the survey questionnaires are transferred into the database (Giordani and Söderlind 2003). This 
section will discuss the possible event of extreme values and the consistency of the forecasts.  
Extreme values (“outliers”) can give biased results, which makes it important to locate them in 
order to assess their importance for our analysis. Figure 11 shows pgdp2 and pgdp6 over time, 
and gives a visual of any potentially problematic outliers. Pgdp2 seem to be relatively 
consistent, which makes sense since this is a “forecast” for the inflation value in the current 
quarter. Pgdp6, on the other hand, seems to have some potenital problematic outliers before the 
second base year change with the most serious being made in 1978q3. In the same quarter one 
can find similar outliers in pgdp4 and pgdp5 (not shown here), which could imply a forecaster 
who has made a mistake or made a forecast that deviates from the consensus. After some 
research, it seems as though these outliers are a result of a respondent giving an optimistic 
forecast (see table 9). This cannot be seen as an outlier beacause it seems as this was indeed the 
forecaster`s beliefs. Since this was the largest outlier, according to figure 11, it is reasonable to 
believe that other potential outliers are just an individual making a slightly more optimistic 
forecast than the consensus.  
Table 9: "Outliers" from ID 47 
 
If the forecasters are consistent, then the quarterly predicted pgdp levels should not be too 
different from the predicted annual levels (Smith and Yetman 2010). In the SPF database there 
seems to be a lack of consistency between the one-year-ahead forecasted inflation (pgdp6 when 
standing in quarter 1 or quarter 4, respectively) and the annual-average forecasts for the current 
year (pgdpa) or next year (pgdpb). This can be examined by plotting the abovementioned 
variables against each other. Figure 13 shows the first of these plots. It shows the difference 
between the forecasted inflation level one year ahead and the forecasted annual-average inflation 
Variable pgdp1 pgdp2 pgdp3 pgdp4 pgdp5 pgdp6
Time 1978q2 1978q3 1978q4 1979q1 1979q2 1979q3
ID=47 150.7 160.9 172.5 185 197.7 211
Mean 150.7 153.7 156.8 160.1 163.1 165.8
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level for the current year, which should be close to zero. As we can see this is not the case, 
especially in the early 80`s, as the difference between the two variables varies from -3 percent to 
+10 percent. After the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia took over the survey in the early 
1990s, the problem almost ceases to exist. This could imply that there was better control over 
what was actually forecasted. The same comparison can be done for inflation forecasts for next 
year and the one-year-ahead forecast (i.e. pgdp6 if the forecaster is in the fourth quarter), and is 
shown in figure 12. The results are similar to what we have seen above, except for the fact that 
the errors are smaller. Nevertheless, we see a distinct improvement in the difference between the 
two variables over time. Another point worth mentioning is that the errors are more centered on 
zero than in figure 13. 
Figure 12 and figure 13: Consistency in forecasts of one-year-ahead inflation and annual 
avareage for current year (left) and next year (right) 
 
One possible solution to this problem is to exclude values which are too extreme from the 
sample, e.g. all values that differs with more than a given percentage point (Smith and Yetman 
2010). This would make the dataset more robust and less exposed to outliers. One problem, 
however, is that we can only perform this consistency check from when the survey started to 
include annual average forecasts in 1981q3. There is no way of checking the consistency for the 
earlier years, but according to the results in figure it is reasonable to suspect that they are not too 
good. Only removing values from the 80`s will not solve the problem which make this solution 
not desirable. Alternative solutions which seem more realistic are to use data from 1990 and 
onwards, or use sub-samples which start after the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia took 
over the survey. 
Figure 12: 
 
Figure 13:  
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5. RESULTS 
This section shows the results from the analysis of forecast accuracy among individual 
forecasters in the SPF. It is divided into several subsections which deal with different research 
questions. The purpose of dividing the analysis up in different parts is to illuminate and inspect 
the accuracy in diverse situations, and see how accuracy is affected.  
5.1 How large are the forecast errors? 
In order to get an overlook of the situation with regards to the forecast accuracy it can be useful 
to document how large and numerous the forecast errors really are. Table 10 gives an indication 
on the frequency and the size of the forecast errors for the individual forecasts. At first glance, it 
can be seen that the percentage of errors larger than the given levels increase as the forecast 
horizon becomes longer. This is a well documented and logical development, as longer horizons 
are harder to predict than shorter ones. One can also see the increased difficulty in forecasting 
longer horizons by looking at the accuracy statistics in the bottom section of the table. It is clear 
that the errors increase with the length of the horizon. Another result worth mentioning is the 
fact that the highest overestimations are much larger than the highest underestimations (see 
“range” variable). On all forecasting horizons, the largest overestimation is almost twice as large 
as the highest underestimation. This could have something to do with the sudden end of the high 
inflation period in the 1970s, where forecasters failed to regulate their forecasts in time.16 
For the one-quarter-ahead forecast the errors do not seem to be very large, as expected (see 
column one). Almost ninety-six percent of all responses have an error below one percent, and 
only 0.4 percent has an error larger than two percent. When looking at the two-quarter-ahead 
forecast the frequency increase, especially for the “smaller” errors (column two). Now only 
eighty-one percent of all responses have an error below one percent, nineteen percent have an 
error above one percent and almost four percent of the responses have an error above two 
percent. The three-quarter-ahead forecasts have only sixty-three percent of responses under one 
                                                 
16 See development of the GDP price index in section 3.3.1, p. 24. 
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percent error, while over ten percent miss the target with more than two percent (column three). 
The last forecast horizon, the one-year-ahead forecast, undoubtedly seems to be the hardest to 
predict of the horizons included (column four). Only fifty percent have an error less than one 
percent, while almost six percent of all responses have an error higher than four percent. 
The MPE statistic in the bottom panel shows that the forecast error for the one-quarter-ahead 
horizon is fairly close to zero. This indicates that the under- and overestimations even out over 
time, making it an accurate forecast on average. For the other horizons, the MPE statistic is 
slightly more positive which indicates that forecasters on average tend to underestimate the 
actual change in inflation. It should be noted, however, that these numbers do not represent a 
large error. Nevertheless, based on this is could seem as forecasters are biased. 
Table 10: Accuracy statistics for different forecast horizons 
 
Going more into detail, table 11 illustrates the largest forecast errors for the different horizons, 
and the individual who gave the forecast. It documents two important points. First, all the largest 
forecast errors (top three for all horizons) are negative, i.e. the largest errors came from an 
overestimation of the actual inflation values. This result is somewhat contradicting when 
compared to table 10 where it was shown that forecasters on average underestimate inflation. 
This means that the number of positive forecast errors have to be larger than the number of 
negative errors in order for the mean error to be positive. Second, all the largest errors are 
almost exclusively from the mid 1970s and early 1980s. This leads to a conclusion that these 
Horizon 1q 2q 3q 4q
Range -5.6 to 3.0 -11.0 to 6.0 -16.4 to 8.1 -22.3 to 12.3
>1% 3.9 % 18.9 % 37.0 % 50.0 %
>2% 0.4 % 3.8 % 10.5 % 18.7 %
>3% 0.1 % 0.9 % 4.7 % 8.8 %
>4% 0.1 % 0.2 % 1.5 % 5.7 %
MPE 0.07 0.16 0.25 0.28
MAE 0.34 0.65 0.99 1.34
RMSE 0.48 0.90 1.39 1.90
Note: Range gives max and min error for each forecast. 
Numbers show how many percent of all responses which are 
above a certain absolute error, for 1-4 quarter horizon. 
MAE=mean absolute error, RMSE=root mean squared error, 
MPE=mean prediction error.
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time periods were harder to predict, which is supported by the standard deviation in figure 2. It 
is no wonder why forecasters were given a bad reputation during this period (Croushore 2006). 
Many of the individuals listed in the table recur several times in the table, across horizons. ID 
117, for example, has eight entries in the table, while ID 125 has seven entries. These 
forecasters apparently had big problems dealing with the high inflation period. Thinking it 
would last longer than it did, they failed to moderate their forecasts for the upcoming inflation 
forecasts. Of the 40 entries in the table (top ten*four horizons) there are only 14 different 
forecasters which mean some optimistic forecasters stand for most of the largest errors. 
Table 11: Largest forecast error for different forecast horizons 
 
Panel A: 1q horizon Panel B: 2q horizon
Number ID Time Error ID Time Error
1 117 1976q1 -5.64 47 1978q3 -11.04
2 41 1981q4 -5.11 117 1976q1 -9.45
3 47 1978q3 -5.10 117 1976q2 -7.01
4 13 1981q4 -4.04 127 1974q3 5.97
5 100 1987q3 -3.40 41 1981q4 -5.38
6 117 1976q2 -3.23 9 1982q1 5.19
7 127 1974q3 2.99 20 1968q4 4.78
8 8 1979q4 2.84 125 1977q3 -4.59
9 62 1982q3 -2.75 13 1981q4 -4.58
10 125 1977q3 -2.71 9 1982q2 4.54
Panel C: 3q horizon Panel D: 4q horizon
ID Time Error ID Time Error
1 47 1978q3 -16.37 47 1978q3 -22.33
2 117 1976q1 -15.45 117 1976q1 -18.95
3 117 1976q2 -11.98 117 1976q2 -17.04
4 127 1974q3 8.13 125 1974q1 12.32
5 9 1982q1 7.32 125 1977q3 -9.89
6 148 1971q3 7.20 7 1974q1 9.22
7 20 1968q4 7.06 148 1973q4 9.19
8 125 1977q3 -6.82 9 1982q1 9.18
9 125 1974q1 6.72 125 1975q1 9.05
10 148 1973q4 6.55 22 1978q3 9.00
Note: The table shows the ten largest forecasting errors and the 
quarter the forecast was made. One panel for each forecasting horizon. 
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5.2 Accuracy for the longest individual forecasting series 
An important objective for forecasters is to generate accurate forecasts over time. One way to 
investigate if the individuals in the SPF database possess this quality is to measure the accuracy 
for the most continuous individuals, i.e. those with the longest consecutive forecasting series 
which I presented earlier (see table 1, p.22). Were these individuals able to accurately predict 
inflation over time? Did they manage to outperform the benchmark model? The result from this 
analysis is shown below in table 12 for the one-quarter-ahead horizon.  
Panel A illustrates how the different individuals performed when all of their responses are 
included (not only data for their longest consecutive series), and how their performance was 
compared to the random walk model. At first sight one can see that the errors are fairly similar 
across individuals, and that the number of individuals who over- or underestimate real change in 
inflation are about the same. The best performer, based on the MAE and RMSE statistics, is ID 
510 with a MAE equal to 0.17 and RMSE equal to 0.22, while ID 483 comes close behind with 
MAE equal to 0.18 and RMSE equal to 0.23. A more striking point is that these two forecasters 
are the only ones who managed to beat the benchmark model, according to Theil’s U-statistic. 
At the other end one can find ID 125, who had almost twice as high RMSE as the random walk 
model. Included in the table is also the coefficient from the forecast comparison regression, and 
the corresponding p-value for the null of β equal to zero. With a five percent significance level, 
β is significantly different from zero for all individuals but two. It thus seems as the individual 
forecasters included in this table indeed have something to add to the forecast of the benchmark 
model, even though they have worse RMSE`s. 
Panel B shows the same statistics as panel A, but now only data comprised by the time span of 
the longest series are included. In addition, a column with RMSE/SD (RMSE normalized with 
the standard deviation) is included which makes it possible to take into consideration that some 
time periods are harder to predict than others. As panel B shows, ID 70 performed best in 
his/hers longest series given the difficulty in that period. His/hers performance was also 
approximately equal to the forecasts from the random walk model (Theil’s U is just above 
unity). Again, only ID 510 and ID 483 managed to outperform the benchmark model even 
though they were not the top performers according to column five. This leads to a preliminary 
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conclusion that a simple random walk model is a good alternative forecast method for predicting 
the one-quarter-ahead change in inflation. It also seems as it was extremely hard to predict the 
change in inflation during the high inflation period, as forecasters perform badly in that period 
even though the difficulty has been taken into consideration. Statistically, the null hypothesis is 
rejected in all instances except two with a five percent level and all instances except five with a 
one percent significance level. According to these results, ID 30 and ID 48 do not statistically 
contribute to the forecast given by the benchmark. All other individuals have something to add 
to the forecast given by the random walk model. In total, it therefore seems as these individuals 
who are included in the table in fact are able to predict inflation accurately over time. 
Table 12: Accuracy statistics for the most persistent individuals 
 
5.3 Have forecast accuracy improved over time?  
A desired attribute for forecasters is the ability to learn from their previous mistakes, and correct 
or it in future forecasts. If individuals do have such a characteristic one could expect the 
accuracy to improve over time, especially taking into consideration that the forecasting 
techniques and tools available have improved (Zarnowitz and Braun 1993). This section will try 
to examine if this is true or not. 
# Id Length Start Stop MAE MPE RMSE T-U β P MAE MPE RMSE T-U RMSE/SD β P
1 65 49 1990q2 2002q2 0.28 0.10 0.39 1.35 0.23 0.021 0.15 -0.01 0.18 1.11 1.02 0.43 0.000
2 510 40 2002q1 2011q4 0.17 0.04 0.22 0.85 0.72 0.000 0.17 0.03 0.22 0.81 0.81 0.77 0.000
3 70 36 1980q4 1989q3 0.34 0.05 0.43 1.13 0.38 0.006 0.27 -0.17 0.31 1.09 0.68 0.40 0.024
4 30 36 1981q3 1990q2 0.38 -0.11 0.46 1.84 0.11 0.135 0.41 -0.14 0.48 1.71 1.58 0.13 0.189
5 60 34 1985q2 1993q3 0.32 -0.12 0.39 1.16 0.34 0.005 0.26 -0.20 0.31 1.44 1.36 0.22 0.038
6 433 34 1991q1 1999q2 0.19 -0.02 0.24 1.26 0.34 0.000 0.17 -0.15 0.21 1.45 1.50 0.19 0.001
7 48 33 1968q4 1976q4 0.58 0.46 0.68 1.63 0.12 0.337 0.58 0.46 0.68 1.63 1.21 0.12 0.337
8 483 32 2004q1 2011q4 0.18 0.04 0.23 0.91 0.61 0.000 0.21 0.05 0.25 0.89 0.85 0.64 0.000
9 446 32 2004q1 2011q4 0.21 0.03 0.25 1.12 0.40 0.001 0.27 0.15 0.32 1.13 1.08 0.40 0.011
10 125 30 1974q1 1981q2 0.60 -0.21 0.85 1.89 0.19 0.001 0.67 -0.30 0.93 2.09 1.84 0.06 0.006
Panel A: Entire dataset Panel B: Longest series
Note: Table shows accuracy statistics for the longest consecutive series of response to the survey,for the one-
quarter-ahead forecast. MAE=mean absolute error, MPE=mean prediction error, RMSE=root mean squared error, T-
U=Theils  U-statistic, SD=standard deviation for the respective time periods the forecast was made, thus 
representing the forecasting difficulty that period. Beta  comes from the forecast comparison regression and P 
denotes the P-value for the null of β=0.
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Table 13 illustrates how forecast accuracy has developed over time, here represented by 
decades. The different panels correspond to different forecast horizons. Based on the RMSE/SD 
variable one can compare accuracy statistics for different time periods and consider different 
levels of difficulty. The MPE statistic for the different decades suggests that the 1980s and 
1990s were overestimated for all horizons, and increasingly so for the longer horizons. In the 
1970s and 2000s, on the other hand, inflation was underestimated for all forecast horizons. What 
is more, the errors seem to converge towards zero which suggests that accuracy has improved. 
For the one quarter horizon the 1990s have been the most accurate decade, based on the MAE 
and RMSE statistics. For the three longest horizons, on the other hand, accuracy has improved 
over time resulting in the 2000s being the most accurate decade. Alternatively, if the RMSE`s 
are normalized with the standard deviation for the respective time periods the 1980s become the 
most accurate decade for the two shortest horizons, while the 2000s are most accurate for the 
two longest horizons. The 1990s brought along the worst forecasting performance in all decades, 
given the difficulty in that period. Thus, even though the accuracy statistics have improved over 
time it seems as forecasters should have performed better given the lower difficulty in the later 
decades. 
The most striking point one can draw from this table is how bad the performance have been 
compared to the benchmark model. For the one quarter horizon, Theil’s U-statistic is fairly close 
to unity which indicates an equal performance of the forecasters and the random walk model. 
For all other periods and horizons the benchmark model performed better, and in the worst 
period the RMSE for the benchmark model was over four times lower than the mean forecast. 
This result is also supported by the forecast comparison regression test. For the shortest horizon 
the null of β equal to zero is rejected for all decades with a five percent significance level, 
suggesting that the survey forecasts have something to add to the forecast given by the 
benchmark model. For the other horizons, however, the picture is less promising. None of the 
β`s are significantly different from zero, implying that the mean forecast have nothing to add to 
the forecast from the benchmark model. 
Going further, one can break down the average forecasts in each decade to show the best 
forecasters, and how they performed compared to the benchmark model. Table 14 shows this 
kind of analysis. According to panel A in the table, ID 145 performed best in the 1970s with ID 
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21 and ID 14 close behind. They also outperformed the benchmark model as most forecasters 
did, except in the 1990s where only one individual slightly outperformed the naïve model. In 
total (panel E) it seems as the random walk performs better than roughly half of the ten best 
forecasters, based on Theil’s U. It also seems as forecasters have improved their forecasting 
over time based on a diminishing RMSE statistic. 
Table 13: Accuracy statistics for different decades 
 
Those individuals who performed best in total (panel E), have made their forecasts exclusively 
in the 1990s and 2000s. This could indicate several things: it was easy decades to forecast 
inflation in, forecasting techniques have improved (better computers, newer theories etc.) or that 
forecasters have improved their skills by learning from previous mistakes. Which one of these 
reasons that have made the largest impact on the accuracy, or if other reasons were present, is 
hard to test. That being said, according to the results in this subsection it is reasonably to believe 
that the forecast accuracy in fact has improved and most likely it is a result of a combination of 
all the above-mentioned reasons. 
An interesting point revealed in table 14 is that very few individuals recur in multiple decades. 
The most obvious explanation is that few participants have responded to the survey for so many 
years. Nevertheless, there are some individuals who have performed well in two consecutive 
decades. ID 94 was ranked sixth in the 1980s and first in the 1990s but did not make it into the 
list containing all responses. Another explanation for none recurring individuals could be that 
studies have shown that there are no forecasters who innately outperform the others (D'Agostino 
RMSE/ RMSE/
Years MPE MAE RMSE SD T-U β P Years MPE MAE RMSE SD T-U β P
Panel A: 1q Panel C: 3q
1970`s 0.26 0.38 0.48 0.87 1.06 0.43 0.046 1970`s 1.03 1.14 1.54 1.04 2.55 0.00 0.976
1980`s -0.16 0.26 0.31 0.54 1.06 0.41 0.001 1980`s -0.64 0.87 1.00 0.62 2.53 -0.05 0.463
1990`s -0.13 0.16 0.19 0.92 1.21 0.32 0.004 1990`s -0.50 0.55 0.60 1.20 3.37 -0.04 0.325
2000`s 0.07 0.20 0.24 0.91 0.91 0.60 0.000 2000`s 0.19 0.49 0.61 0.94 2.05 0.08 0.282
Panel B: 2q Panel D: 4q
1970`s 0.60 0.73 0.97 0.95 1.77 0.09 0.506 1970`s 1.55 1.67 2.26 1.16 3.49 -0.08 0.315
1980`s -0.37 0.55 0.64 0.57 1.76 0.03 0.636 1980`s -0.98 1.20 1.40 0.69 3.26 -0.07 0.308
1990`s -0.30 0.34 0.38 1.04 2.13 0.06 0.315 1990`s -0.71 0.79 0.85 1.35 4.43 -0.06 0.075
2000`s 0.14 0.34 0.42 0.92 1.51 0.21 0.076 2000`s 0.24 0.65 0.82 0.99 2.56 0.01 0.812
Note: Table shows average statistic per decade, and each panel shows a different forecast horizon. P shows p-
value for the null of β=0. See table 12 for additional notes. 
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et al. 2010). For that reason, it is not likely anyone will recur as top performers in several 
decades. 
 
Table 14: Top ten forecasters per decade 
 
Nevertheless, it would be interesting to examine this question further. It is possible that some 
individuals are top performers in multiple quarters (in contrast to decades discussed above). If it 
turns out that some individuals are systematically outperforming the others in several quarters it 
could be an important finding. By learning what characterizes a top performer, researchers can 
gain valuable insight into well-functioning techniques and theories. If these findings could be 
generalized, others may learn from the findings and consequently people would get more correct 
inflation expectations.  
Table 15 below illustrates this question. Every time an individual has given one of the best 
forecasts (top five) in a quarter, he/she is given one point. This can then be compared to the 
number of quarters the individual has participated in the survey (column four).The first 
noticeable point from table 15 is the low number of quarters the individuals in the table have 
been top performers compared to their total number of responses. It does not seem as any of the 
individuals have managed to consistently outperform the others. That being said, there are one 
individual who separates somewhat from the rest. ID 20 is listed in all panels in the table which 
indicates that this person was one of the best performers for all horizons. What is more, in the 
# ID RMSE T-U ID RMSE T-U ID RMSE T-U ID RMSE T-U ID RMSE T-U
1 145 0.357 0.73 80 0.249 0.87 94 0.146 1.26 500 0.172 0.88 440 0.167 1.63
2 21 0.376 0.79 44 0.273 0.78 429 0.150 1.02 502 0.183 1.00 414 0.178 1.16
3 14 0.380 0.83 99 0.289 0.99 440 0.167 1.63 439 0.194 0.98 416 0.181 1.28
4 133 0.426 1.02 51 0.296 1.04 431 0.169 0.99 510 0.214 0.80 502 0.189 0.95
5 84 0.427 0.92 94 0.298 1.06 411 0.176 1.18 498 0.219 0.89 500 0.195 0.90
6 7 0.429 0.99 67 0.300 0.94 414 0.180 1.22 407 0.227 0.82 409 0.205 1.68
7 89 0.431 0.91 5 0.304 1.01 416 0.181 1.28 483 0.235 0.87 510 0.215 1.11
8 138 0.443 1.07 70 0.314 1.11 65 0.184 1.13 548 0.247 0.75 429 0.219 0.83
9 144 0.459 1.04 84 0.330 1.04 446 0.191 1.22 456 0.248 1.14 404 0.223 1.48
10 66 0.465 0.94 15 0.332 1.31 424 0.193 1.25 508 0.249 1.13 483 0.226 0.90
Panel A: 1970`s Panel B: 1980`s Panel C: 1990`s Panel D: 2000`s Panel E: All
Note: The table shows the ten best forecasters in each decade based on RMSE for the one-quarter-
ahead horizon. Individuals with less than ten responses in the respective decades have been 
removed in order to secure against a lucky guess and remove those whose series stop early in a 
decade. See table 12 for additional notes.
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four quarter horizon ID 20 have five more top rankings than next person on the list. Compared 
to the total number of responses it cannot be said that this is impressive, but it is still a signal 
that this individual performed better than the rest. The unanswered question is if this is enough 
to get some general insight in what characterizes a top performer. 
This finding is in line with Batchelor (1990) who showed that there are no consistency in 
individuals’ characteristics in accuracy rankings that can be used to pick the best individual 
forecasters. Zarnowitz (1984) also concluded that no single forecaster has been able to earn a 
consistent superior accuracy, as others have done before him (Zarnowitz 1967; McNees 1979, 
cited in (Zarnowitz 1984)).  
Table 15: Individuals with the highest number of top five rankings 
 
5.4 Accuracy during recessions 
According to the National Bureau of Economic Research (2010, p. 1), a recession is defined as 
“a significant decline in economic activity spread across the economy, lasting more than a few 
months, normally visible in real GDP, real income, employment, industrial production, and 
wholesale-retail sales”. Such economic downturns produce uncertainty and increased volatility 
in macroeconomic variables and therefore it also represents one of the more difficult times to 
predict inflation. How will the central bank react? How will it affect consumption and saving? 
The outcome of inflation will depend on the answer of such questions, thus making it very 
# ID Top RMSE Total # ID Top RMSE Total
Panel A: 1q Panel C: 3q
1 433 7 0.24 68 1 446 9 0.69 70
2 407 6 0.27 69 2 65 8 1.06 123
3 84 6 0.30 122 3 20 7 1.25 88
Panel B: 2q Panel D: 4q
1 428 7 0.50 75 1 20 13 1.55 88
2 65 6 0.69 123 2 431 8 0.84 64
3 431 5 0.43 64 3 420 8 0.88 69
Note: The table shows individuals with the highest number of forecasts 
which wereranked best in a quarter and total responses to the survey.  
Panel A-D shows 1-4 quarter horizon, respectively. Panel A: ID 20 and 60 
also have six top rankings but higher rmse. Panel B: ID 20, 72, 94 and 472
also have five top rankings but higher rmse. Panel D: ID 15, 30 and 411 
also have eight top rankings but higher rmse.
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difficult to predict the actual inflation change. Previous findings seem to suggest that forecasters 
are not able to predict turning points, and most forecasters failed to predict the recessions in the 
early 1990s (Batchelor 2000). This section will examine how accurately individuals managed to 
predict inflation during recessions in the U.S. 
The first panel in table 16 shows average statistics for the different recessions. Several of these 
results are worth mentioning. First, forecasters have been more accurate during the most recent 
recessions than the older ones, both when difficulty is included (fourth column) and not. In fact, 
if one looks at the RMSE statistic it seems to be a clear distinction between the RMSE before 
and after the fourth recession in the early 1980s. After this recession, forecasters seem to be 
better at predicting inflation during recessions. It could mean the later recessions have affected 
inflation in a less prominent way, making forecasting easier. On the other hand, it could also 
suggest that forecasters have learned from previous recessions and have become better at 
predicting inflation in difficult times. Second, the worst recession, in terms of forecast accuracy, 
was the second recession during the high inflation period in the mid 1970s. This conclusion 
holds both when looking at the RMSE and the MAE statistic. If the standard deviation is 
included, however, forecasters were least accurate in the first and third recessions. Third, 
forecasters underestimated inflation during the first three recessions but have overestimated 
inflation in the last four recessions. It seems as though newer recessions have brought lower 
inflation than what most forecasters predicted. One natural reason for this is the Federal 
Reserve, who has kept a much tighter leash on inflation after it was brought under control in the 
mid 1980s. Thus, it has also become easier to predict the outcome of GDP price index as it has 
been less volatile in the more recent recessions (see figure 2, p.21). 
Panel B goes more into detail, and shows the best individual in each recession based on the 
RMSE statistic, and how they performed compared to the simple random walk model. As can be 
seen, there are no individuals who were top performer in several recessions. It also seems, as 
pointed out above, that forecasters have improved their predicting skills because both the RMSE 
and RMSE/SD variables are declining over time. When comparing panel B to table 14, which 
shows top performers by decade, an interesting point emerges: none of the ten best performers 
in each decade are the best performer in a recession. This may be due to several reasons. First, 
most forecasters did not complete the survey during all quarters the recession lasted which 
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means they are not included in the evaluation in panel B. Second, the best performers in table 14 
may be biased if they did not predict inflation in “hard” quarters (i.e. quarters with a high 
standard deviation). This would lead to higher accuracy statistics as harder quarters often bring 
along higher forecast errors. Third, being a good forecaster involves predicting correct values of 
inflation but it also implies being good at predicting turning points in inflation, e.g. changes 
before and after a recession. Take ID 117 as an example. He/she was the best performer during 
the recession in the early 1970s (no. 2) but is not to be found on the list of top ten performers 
during the decade. The reason for this could be found in table 11. ID 117 has the highest 
forecast error ever given for the one-quarter-ahead forecast horizon which means that he/she 
totally failed in his/hers prediction when the high inflation growth ended. Thus, many of the best 
performers during the decade may have been better at predicting the turning point of the 
recession which kept their total performance close to the top.  
Table 16: Forecast accuracy during contractions for the one-quarter-ahead horizon17 
 
                                                 
17 Due to the short time span of the recessions there are insufficient observations to do a forecast comparison regression test. 
Recession four (1981q3-1982q4) had only one individual who responded to all surveys throughout the recession. All the others 
had three or more to individuals to rank. 
Time of recession MAE MPE RMSE RMSE/SD ID MAE MPE RMSE RMSE/SD T-U
1: 1969q4 - 1970q4 0.49 0.38 0.56 2.53 86 0.35 0.22 0.41 1.86 1.22
2: 1973q4 - 1975q1 0.77 0.58 0.90 1.80 117 0.56 0.46 0.68 1.36 1.39
3: 1980q1 - 1980q3 0.40 0.26 0.61 2.51 98 0.19 0.19 0.23 0.95 0.90
4: 1981q3 - 1982q4 0.48 -0.27 0.72 2.18 70 0.39 -0.39 0.45 1.36 1.71
5: 1990q3 - 1991q1 0.24 -0.16 0.32 2.06 62 0.14 -0.14 0.17 1.10 0.65
6: 2001q1 - 2001q4 0.17 -0.06 0.22 1.28 428 0.11 -0.05 0.12 0.67 0.66
7: 2007q4 - 2009q2 0.26 -0.12 0.35 1.20 472 0.14 -0.13 0.19 0.65 0.59
Panel A: Average statistics Panel B: Best individual
Note: This table shows accuracy statistics for the one-quarter-ahead forecast horizon for 
different recessionary periods in the US economy, as defined ny the National Bureau of 
Economic Research (NBER).  Average statistics (panel A) are calculated across the time period for 
the recession, the same goes for the standard deviation. The individual must have participated in 
all surveys which are included by the time period given by the NBER in order to be considered in 
panel B. See table 12 for additional notes.
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5.5 Which industry contains the best forecasters? 
Even though previous literature has studied individual forecasts, there is to my knowledge none 
who have used the industry variable in their research. One obvious reason for this is that there 
have been no studies on individual data after the industry variable was introduced in 1990q2. 
Thus, an analysis of the accuracy for the different industries is very interesting and of current 
interest. 
The Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia allocates an industry number based on the type of 
firm the individual currently works at. Industry one contains people working in a firm 
characterized as a financial provider (investment banking, hedge and mutual funds, asset 
management etc.), industry two contains non-financial providers (universities, forecasting firms, 
research firms etc) while industry three contains all people where they do not know the 
affiliation. Having the ability to predict the inflation correctly would be of great importance to 
all of these firms, as forecasting is a large part of their daily jobs.   
Table 17 shows the forecast accuracy for the different industries for four different forecast 
horizons. Some of the results from this table are worth presenting. First, there seems to be slight 
differences in accuracy between the different industries. Based on the MPE statistic, industry 1 
and 2 outperform industry 3 with about 1.5 percentage points. However, if we base performance 
on MAE and RMSE statistics, they are almost identical in performance and this goes for all 
forecast horizons. It seems as though none of the industries have an advantage over others when 
it comes to forecasting inflation. Second, a more striking result is that all industries across all 
forecast horizons seem to have overestimated inflation in their predictions. This finding is 
somewhat contradictory to the earlier findings where it was suggested a tendency towards 
underestimation (see table 10 and table 18). The explanation for this is simple and can be found 
in table 13. On average, forecasters have underestimated inflation in the 1970s and 1980s, while 
they have overestimated inflation in the 1990s and 2000s. Thus, since I only use data from 
1990q2 in this analysis it will result in an overestimation from the industries. This also shows 
what happens to the forecasting accuracy when the turbulent 1970s and 1980s are removed from 
the sample. 
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With this in mind a new question arises: are the industries biased? After performing a bias test it 
seems as the answer depends on the forecast horizon (see table 17). For the two shortest 
horizons the null hypothesis of α equal to zero cannot be rejected, thus suggesting unbiasedness. 
For the two longest horizons, however, the results are opposite. On a five percent significance 
level all industries are biased. On the other hand, if we use a one percent significance level it is 
only industry one and two for the longest horizon which are biased. 
Table 17: Forecast accuracy for different industries 
 
5.6 Overall performance 
This section will provide a discussion concerning the overall performance of the individual 
forecasters. More specifically, it will examine the predictive accuracy and biasedness of 
individuals, and how forecasters perform compared to the random walk model. The analysis will 
be divided into two sub-samples; one containing all observations and one containing data from 
1990q2 when the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia took over the survey. 
Table 10 indicated, based on the MPE statistic, that forecasters on average underestimate 
inflation. If this is true, it is a problematic result because if forecasters are systematically 
underestimating the forecasted variable it means that forecasters do not learn from their previous 
mistakes and therefore are biased. Table 18 examines this in more detail, and shows the 
percentage of responses that fall over or under the true change in real inflation for each of the 
four different forecast horizons (see panel A). It confirms the earlier findings, because 
individuals seem to persistently underestimate real change in inflation. On all horizons, more 
Industry MPE MAE RMSE α P Industry MPE MAE RMSE α P
Panel A: 1q Panel C: 3q
1 -0.007 0.226 0.290 -0.007 0.504 1 -0.070 0.611 0.751 -0.070 0.041
2 -0.009 0.221 0.278 -0.009 0.334 2 -0.062 0.597 0.740 -0.064 0.037
3 -0.027 0.222 0.302 -0.027 0.265 3 -0.175 0.574 0.751 -0.175 0.030
Panel B: 2q Panel D: 4q
1 -0.026 0.419 0.519 -0.027 0.233 1 -0.133 0.810 0.991 -0.141 0.003
2 -0.028 0.403 0.501 -0.028 0.147 2 -0.113 0.808 0.995 -0.118 0.006
3 -0.093 0.392 0.508 -0.093 0.070 3 -0.229 0.785 0.994 -0.234 0.041
Note: The table shows  accuracy statistics for different industries, on average across time. The 
panels shows different forecasting horizons. Data from 1992q2. α=bias, p=p-value for null  
hypothesis α=0. See notes to table 12.
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than 50 percent of all responses are below the actual outcome. This seems to indicate some sort 
of biasedness among the individual forecasters. However, when testing this statistically the 
results are not that shocking. According to the results in the table below, roughly two-thirds of 
the individuals have an α significantly different from zero which mean they are biased. As the 
horizon increases, so does the percentage of biased forecasters. The increase cannot be said to be 
alarming, however, as it only rises slightly more than two percentage points from the one quarter 
horizon to the four quarter horizon. The same table also gives a nice summary with regards to 
the forecast performance of the individuals compared to the benchmark model. It shows the 
proportion of responses which perform better or worse than the benchmark. The results are a bit 
striking, as they indicate that the majority of responses from the survey are worse than the 
simple benchmark. For the four quarter horizon, for example, 86 percent of the responses were 
worse than the benchmark. Note, however, that the table says nothing about the difference 
between the forecasts. So if the individual forecast is 0.001 percent worse than the benchmark it 
is still considered to be worse, even though the difference is not significant. Therefore, I also 
conducted a forecast comparison regression for all individuals to see how many percent of the 
individuals who in fact have no information to add compared to the random walk model. For the 
one quarter horizon, almost 50 percent of the individuals have a comparison regression 
coefficient which is significantly different from zero implying they have something to add to the 
forecast from the benchmark model. For the longer horizons it looks worse, as only 12.5 
percent, 9.1 percent and 16.6 percent add information to the forecast from the benchmark model 
in the two-four quarter horizons. This basically means that the majority of individuals fail to 
outperform a simple random walk model. 
Table 18 also shows the same statistics when only data from 1990q2 and onwards are being 
analyzed (see panel B). This will illustrate how the forecasting performance for the individual 
forecasters is when the high inflation period and most of the problems discussed in section 4.3 
are removed. The situation seems to be a bit better. According to the table, most forecasters are 
now overestimating inflation in contrast to panel A where underestimations were more frequent. 
Nevertheless, it still suggests biased forecasts and therefore the same bias test as above was 
conducted. For this sample, the test shows fewer individuals being biased for all horizons than 
for the sample including all horizons. This leads to an assumption that forecasters predicting in 
the last two decades are more accurate than forecasters predicting in the earlier years. It could 
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also suggest that forecasters thus have become more accurate over time. The bottom section of 
panel B illustrates how the SPF forecasters’ performance was compared to the random walk 
model. Here the results are not much better than before, emphasizing the good performance of 
the random walk model. Based on percentages, the numbers are almost exactly the same as one 
could see when the whole dataset was included. However, when the forecast comparison 
regression is conducted the results are better than before for the two shortest horizons. Now over 
67 percent of forecasters in the one quarter horizon, and 21 percent of forecasters in the two 
quarter horizon have something to add to the forecast by the random walk model. For the three 
quarter horizon, on the other hand, the situation is similar to the previous findings, while the 
four quarter horizon actually has fewer individuals who can beat the random walk. 
In total it seems as forecasters have improved over time as tests show that there are fewer biased 
individuals and more individuals manage to beat the random walk model. Still, the majority fail 
to give forecasts that contain more information than the forecast from the random walk model 
for the three longest horizons. 
Table 18: Overall performance for two different sub-samples 
 
5.7 Comments 
Given the information in section 4.2 (p. 27) concerning the timing of the survey, it seems 
reasonable that I have chosen a benchmark model that use information available in the previous 
quarter. However, due to the implications with revision in the GDP variable, as mentioned 
1q 2q 3q 4q 1q 2q 3q 4q
Overestimation 46.8 % 46.5 % 45.5 % 47.3 % 53.3 % 54.2 % 54.8 % 55.8 %
Underestimation 53.2 % 53.5 % 54.5 % 52.7 % 46.7 % 45.8 % 45.2 % 44.2 %
Biased (α=0)* 33.8 % 35.1 % 35.1 % 36.1 % 25.1 % 28.1 % 30.5 % 30.3 %
Worse than RW 59.9 % 74.5 % 81.2 % 85.9 % 59.8 % 74.1 % 80.7 % 84.4 %
Better than RW 40.1 % 25.5 % 18.8 % 14.1 % 40.2 % 25.9 % 19.3 % 15.6 %
β=0*, p<0.05 49.4 % 12.5 % 9.1 % 16.6 % 67.1 % 21.2 % 9.4 % 8.3 %
Panel A: All observations Panel B: Observations from 1990q2
Note: Top three rows show the proportion of responses which over- or underestimate real inflation,  
and the proportion of individuals who are biased. Bottom three rows show the proportion of 
responses which predict better or worse than the RW model, and the proportion of individuals 
where the null ofβ equal to zero is rejected on a 5% level
*One individual dropped due to insufficient data for the 4q horizon.
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before, it could have given the benchmark model a too big advantage which in turn biased my 
results. I have therefore repeated the analysis in the lower part of table 18 with the random walk 
model lagged one more quarter to see if this affected the results. According to table 19, it did not 
remarkably change the results. The majority of the forecasts are still worse than the random 
walk model on all horizons. The results from the forecast comparison regression test are 
somewhat better for the two shortest horizons, but equal in the two longer horizons. 
I also could have included different time series models as comparison, but after seeing the 
results from the simple random walk model I chose not to. According to Ang et al. (2007) an 
ARMA(1,1) model is one of the best performers among time series models when predicting CPI 
inflation. This model, which is not very sophisticated either, performs slightly better than the 
random walk model for my data as well, and therefore I see no point in repeating all the analysis 
when the results are known in advance. Based on the data and techniques I have used it is 
apparent that time series models are capable of predicting GDP price index inflation quite well. 
Table 19: Performance relative to benchmark after lagging 
 
1q 2q 3q 4q
Worse than RW 55.6 % 65.5 % 72.9 % 77.8 %
Better than RW 44.4 % 34.5 % 27.1 % 22.2 %
β=0*, p<0.05 54.5 % 21.6 % 9.7 % 16.7 %
Note: Performance relative to RW model after lagging 
values one more qurter. See table 18.
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6. Conclusion 
The purpose of this thesis has been two-folded. First, as a part of a research project I cooperated 
with a co-student in an attempt to give an overview of potential and current problems with the 
SPF database. It was our intention to document these problems and come up with possible 
solutions based on our own suggestions or based on earlier findings in the literature concerning 
the database. Second, I sought to given an assessment of the forecast accuracy of individual 
forecasters based on data from the SPF. Most previous and up to date studies concerning survey 
data have used pooled data in form of a mean or median to give an assessment. In that respect, 
this thesis is a supplement to the existing literature. 
We found five problems with the database which are worth mentioning. First, it has been noted 
in previous literature working with individual data that forecasters respond infrequently to the 
survey. A well adopted solution is to drop all individuals with fewer than twelve responses. 
Second, there is a problem with missing values in the one-year-ahead forecast. Due to 
incomplete survey questionnaires by some respondents there are five quarters which have no 
value for this forecast horizon. A solution is to start with data from 1972q3, as all quarters with 
missing values are located in the beginning of the survey. A second solution is to fill in values, 
e.g. based on a linear projection. A third problem is reallocation of used ID’s. Due to lack of 
control in the early periods of the survey there may be a problem with several individuals 
forecasting under the same ID number. This will make impossible to separate individuals from 
one another. It is guaranteed, however, that this is only a potential problem with date from 
before the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia took over the survey in 1990q2. Fourth, it 
should be noted that several variables have multiple changes in base year. This will only pose a 
problem if level data are being used, but can be ignored if changes in these variables are being 
used. Fifth, there seem to be a problem concerning the consistency in the forecasted values. The 
one-year-ahead inflation often deviates from the forecast of the annual growth next year, for 
instance. A solution adopted in the literature is to chop of those observations which seem to be 
inconsistent. A new problem arises, however, due to the fact that the annual average forecast 
was introduced in 1980q1 and we have no way of checking how inconsistent forecasters were 
before this date. 
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With regards to the forecast accuracy of individual forecasts there are several findings. First, 
some individuals are able to accurately predict inflation over time and it also seems as they 
become more accurate over time. This finding is based on analysis of the longest individual 
forecasting series in the database and forecast accuracy across decades. None of the individuals 
seem to systematically outperform the other forecasters in the database. Why forecasters have 
improved over time is hard to test based on this data, so I can only conjecture. It may be that 
forecasters have improved their skills by learning from previous mistakes and enhancing their 
knowledge. However, it could also be a result of better technology and a less volatile underlying 
variable. Second, forecast accuracy during recessions have been worse than the average 
accuracy during the respective decades suggesting a deteriorating performance during difficult 
times. Nevertheless, some individuals performed well during these difficult times and 
outperformed the random walk model. It also seems as the accuracy have improved from the 
earliest recessions to the newer ones. This underlines the above-mentioned finding that forecasts 
are getting more accurate over time. No newer papers have documented this, but Zarnowitz and 
Braun (1993) found no improvement in their dataset up until 1990. Third, I find no difference 
between industries in terms of forecasting accuracy for any horizon. I did, however, find 
evidence suggesting biasedness in the two longest horizons which means that they are 
systematically overestimating inflation. This is, as far as I know, a new finding and thus is a 
valuable contribution to the existing literature. Fourth, I also find evidence for bias among some 
individuals. The majority, about two-thirds, seems to be unbiased. This result is similar to 
Zarnowitz (1985), and somewhat contradicting to Keane and Runkle (1990) who find no 
evidence of bias. Fifth, most of the individuals fail to add information to the forecast given by 
the same change random walk model. This applies especially for the three longest horizons. This 
is somewhat contradicting to previous findings. Ang et al. (2007), for example, find that surveys 
outperform most time series models in forecasting CPI inflation. It should be noted, however, 
that researchers have found that a random walk model can perform well in forecasting inflation 
(Ang et al. 2007; Atkeson and Ohanian 2001).  
Given the importance for most economic actors of having correct inflation forecasts it is 
imperative to continue the research on this phenomenon and questions related to the issue. 
Based on the results in this paper, it would be interesting to see a study on individual forecasts 
of the GDP price index when vintage data are used (in contrast to revised data, which I used). 
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This might explain some of the difference in forecasting accuracy between individuals and the 
random walk model. Further studies could also address the importance of having correct 
expectations. If it turns out forecasters are biased, how will this affect policy decisions? Another 
important question in this regard is how expectations from surveys affect the overall inflation 
expectation in the society. If people use surveys as a source of information, which consequences 
would it have if survey expectations is not satisfactory? 
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